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Cleaning in the Shadow of the Law?
Unilateral Divorce Laws and Husband's Share of Household Work and Leisure

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Abstract

Previous literature has established that unilateral divorce laws may reduce female household work as well as overall marital investment. However, no literature to date has examined how unilateral divorce laws may affect males' household production, market work and leisure. Despite the clear economic costs to women upon divorce, evidence suggests that men face quite high psychological and health costs of marital dissolution. If men face higher costs to divorce, then the reduction in friction to marital dissolution from unilateral divorce may be associated with an increase in males' share of household work, as women consume more leisure. In addition, as established by Stevenson (2007), unilateral divorce laws may affect overall marital investment. To examine these issues, we use data on matched couples from the PSID and exploit variation over time in state divorce laws. This research indicates that unilateral divorce laws are associated with an increase in males' share of household work, and an overall decrease in total household work. Moreover, the increase in males' share of household work is strongest among couples who have children, consistent with a relatively higher cost of marital dissolution among fathers given prevailing custody arrangements.

Introduction

While a large literature has examined the impact of divorce laws on a host of female labor supply and other measures (Friedberg, 1998; Gray, 1998; Dee, 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006; Wolfers, 2006; Genadek et al, 2007; Stevenson, 2007), essentially no literature has examined how these same laws may affect husbands' total labor supply in household and market work and leisure, nor has the literature examined how the share of household labor supply and leisure may be affected by these laws. If males and females face differential costs from divorce, then standard bargaining theory predicts that divorce law changes may affect the share of leisure by gender, holding constant overall marital investment. However, if, as shown by Stevenson (2007), unilateral divorce laws decrease overall marital investment, then the decrease in household production among females documented by Gray (1998) may simply reflect a reduction in overall marital investment rather than a change in bargaining power. To what extent does the reduction in female household work represent gender differences in household production following the passage of unilateral divorce laws versus an overall change in marital investment due to decreased frictions to marital dissolution? Do unilateral divorce laws affect men's household work? And are there heterogeneous effects on household work and leisure by the cost of marital dissolution? To date, no literature has systematically examined the effects of divorce laws on both genders' household work and leisure, as well as overall household production and leisure.

To examine this issue, this paper uses a difference-in-difference strategy to compare how men's overall and relative share of household and market labor supply and leisure are affected by changes in divorce laws, as well as how the overall level of household work in home production, market work and leisure are affected. I find that unilateral divorce laws significantly increase males' share of household work and decrease their leisure, while

increasing females' share of leisure among the couple. In addition, those males who may be expected to face higher costs from divorce—those with children—face a disproportionate increase their share of household work following unilateral divorce laws, offsetting a decrease in household work among mothers in those states with unilateral divorce laws.[1]

While this result may be surprising at first glance given the well-known high economic costs that women bear following divorce, statistics reveal that women show a relatively high preference for divorce relative to men, with roughly two-thirds of divorce proceedings initiated by women (Braver, Whitley and Ng, 1993; Brinig and Allen, 2000). If women view divorce to be less costly than men do, as will be discussed later, then unilateral divorce laws should increase transfers from men to women, with import for intra-household allocation and gender dynamics.

Theory and Background

Divorce law changes may affect the incentives to invest in marriage both through bargaining channels and because changes in the probability of divorce may affect overall marital investment. Gray (1998) examines how divorce laws affect women's labor supply, home production and divorce rates and finds support for bargaining models as compared to the unitary model, as women in states with unilateral divorce and generally favorable divorce settlements for women decreased their hours in home production and increased their leisure. But if changes in divorce laws affect the overall investment in marriage, then the effect on the *share* of leisure in the household by gender is unclear; both partners' investment in household production may have declined. Stevenson (2007) finds lower overall investment in marriage-specific capital in states with unilateral divorce laws, including lower investment in spousal

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1   An alternative explanation for the larger gender differential in household work among parents is that parents may have more incentive to behave strategically if fertility increases the probability of divorce. However, as will be discussed later in the paper, fertility appears to be associated with a lower probability of divorce.

education, fewer children, and increased female labor force participation. To examine transfers due to bargaining power, I examine spousal share of household work and leisure. While leisure is a straightforward transfer, time spent in production of marital public goods such as housework can be thought of as a transfer as well.[2]

Other research has focused on the labor supply effects of unilateral divorce and property division laws, particularly female labor supply effects due to increased probability of marital dissolution. Johnson and Skinner (1986) find that marital dissolution is associated with a slight decrease in males' labor supply and a much larger increase in female hours in market work, while divorce legalization in Ireland has been associated with a significant increase in labor supply among those women with a high probability of divorce (Bargain et al. 2012). Similarly, Genadek et al. (2007) find a significant increases in mothers' labor supply following the passage of unilateral divorce laws.

This paper contributes to the literature by disentangling the various effects of unilateral divorce from overall marital investment and bargaining power to examine how divorce law changes have affected both spouses' overall market and home production, as well as how husband's share has been affected.

Bargaining Power: Health or Money?

The economic hardships that many women face following divorce have been well documented, with divorced women's incomes falling substantially on average both in absolute terms and relative to their former husband's (Holden and Smock, 1991; Bianchi, 1999). Census data from 2009 indicates that 22% of women who have divorced within the last year are below poverty, compared to 12% of divorced men (Elliot and Simmons, 2011). Women who do not

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2   Friedberg and Stern (2012) show that hours spent in household work are positively associated with side
    payments within a marriage.

remarry suffer the largest economic losses (Duncan and Hoffman, 1985; Peters, 1993).

However, despite the high financial costs that women bear upon divorce, evidence exists that men may bear substantial costs following a divorce, particularly psychological and health costs. While divorce is associated with higher mortality rates for both genders, the increase in mortality following marital dissolution is higher for men than women, with an increase in male mortality risk upon divorce of 10% and 5% for females (Gardner and Oswald, 2004). Similarly, in a meta-analysis, Shor et al. (2012) find significantly higher mortality risk among men than women following a divorce. Moreover, men face higher suicide rates upon marital dissolution; using data from the National Longitudinal Mortality Study, Kposowa (2000) finds that divorced men face a suicide risk double that of married men, with no significant difference in suicide rates among females by marital status. This research suggests that men's health may be a form of household production. If so, as pointed out by Pollak (2005) this household production may be an important source of bargaining power, particularly if remarriage is not costless.

Other research suggests that women have higher levels of dissatisfaction with their marriage. Data from the National Survery of Families and Households (NSFH) indicates that more women than men report that they are unhappily married but that their spouse is happy with the marriage (Schoen et al., 2002). In addition, women are significantly more likely to report open marital disagreement and to report that they believe the marriage to be troubled (Blair, 2003).

Moreover, divorced women are more likely to report that they wanted their marriage to end. Again, using data from the NSFH, table one illustrates the percentage of respondents by gender who wanted the marriage to end. The differences are stark; close to one-third of male respondents reported that their partner wanted the marriage to end, but the respondent did not,

with only 11% of females reporting the same. Similarly, only 14% of males reporting that they wished the marriage to end, and their partner did not, with close to 40% of females reporting the same. Overall, roughly 60% of females wanted to marriage to end more than their partner, with less than 30% of males reporting a higher preference for ending the marriage.

Table two shows divorced respondents' self-reported happiness by gender. Again, while both genders are generally happier after divorce, we see much higher reported happiness post-divorce among females than males. Among females, 56% report that their overall happiness after separation was "much better", as compared to 39% of males. Finally, as previously mentioned, most divorces are initiated by women; from 1965 to 1990 when our data was collected, women were the plaintiffs in about 70% of the divorce cases in the U.S.[3] To the extent that these gender differentials in filing rates and health measures reflect real gender differentials in costs to divorce, one may expect changes to divorce laws that lower transaction costs of divorce to increase transfers from men to women, including leisure and household work.

Fertility and Gender Differentials in Costs of Marital Dissolution

Obviously, this bargaining power may be affected by partner characteristics and marital capital as well. In particular, as has been widely noted, fertility may introduce gender differentials in bargaining power, since women may lose human capital relative to men if the mother is the primary caretaker of the child. However, once children are born, men face potentially greater costs to divorce than women, since women at the time our data was collected were generally awarded custody, allowing women control over the most important marital capital, as well as direct decision making regarding expenditure of child support. Brinig and Allen (2000) find that maternal custody following divorce was one of the strongest predictors

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3   See Brinig and Allen (2000) for a thorough discussion of female divorce filing rates in the U.S. historically and gender differentials in divorce.

of the female initiating divorce proceedings, with similar negative effects of paternal custody on female initiation of divorce.

To further explore this issue, table one breaks out spousal preference for divorce by couples with children and without. While we see the same overall gender patterns as for childless couples, these results are consistent with an even higher gender differential in costs to divorce among parents. Of females, over 40% of mothers reported that they wanted the marriage to end, but their partner did not, while only 30% of women without children reported the same. Similarly, close to one-third of fathers reported that they did not want the marriage to end, but their partner did, with only 26% of men without children reporting the same.

Table two breaks out self-reported happiness by parental status and finds similar, if not as strikingly consistent, results. Both fathers and mothers report much lower levels of happiness after separation than those without children. Mothers in particular are much less likely to describe their overall happiness level post-separation as "much better". However, there is a higher differential in happiness post-separation between parents and those without children among men. Close to 20% of fathers report happiness levels which are "much worse" or "worse" as compared to only 10% of childless men, while close to 13% of mothers report happiness levels that are "much worse" or "worse", as compared to 9% of childless women. Similarly, 62% of fathers report happiness levels that are "somewhat better" or "much better" than pre-separation as compared to 76% of childless men, while 76% of mothers report that their happiness is "somewhat better" or "much better" as compared to roughly 81% of childless women.

If the relative costs of marital dissolution between men and women are particularly high among couples with children due to loss of contact with children, then one might expect to see relatively higher transfers from men to women as unilateral divorce laws lower frictions to

ending a marriage.

Data and Empirical Strategy

I use data from the PSID collected from 1968 to 1990 on matched couples consisting of the head of household and partner within their first two years of marriage, merged with state divorce law data from Stevenson (2007). Following Stevenson, I include only the first two years of marriage to avoid selection bias due to attrition from divorce and other factors. As a result, these results should be interpreted as the effect of divorce law on newly-wed couples' time use. As pointed out by Rasul (2006) and Stevenson (2007), unilateral divorce laws may affect the decision to marry as well as behavior within marriage. These results cannot separately identify these two mechanisms.

To identify gender differentials in household production, market work and leisure resulting from unilateral divorce laws, I estimate the following regression:

$$y_{it}=\beta_1 * male_{it} * unilateral_{st} + \beta_2 * (1-male_{it}) * unilateral_{st} + X_{it}\varphi + \alpha t + R\gamma_r + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where y_{it} equals time spent in household work, market work or leisure per week, $unilateral_{st}$ is an indicator variable for unilateral divorce laws, x_{it} includes individual level demographic characteristics, such as gender, education, race, age and the MSA of the residence, t represents a time trend, and R is regional fixed effects.[4] Obviously, β_1 identifies the effects of unilateral divorce laws on male time use, while β_2 identifies that of females.

Since unilateral divorce laws may affect overall marital investment as well as individual contributions to household production and market work, I estimate the following metrics of time spent in household, market work and leisure: total individual time, total time per couple, and the individual percent of total time spent in household work, market work and leisure.

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4   I also estimated the models using state fixed effects. However, given the large number of state dummy variables for the sample size, identification was tenuous and led to unreasonably large effects. As a result, to be conservative, the preferred specification includes regional fixed effects.

Weekly leisure is calculated as time spent not working or doing household work, given a total of 168 hours per week. For the total time per couple, the unit of analysis is the household, and gender is omitted.

Tables three and four present some summary statistics. As expected, women spend significantly more time in household work, with an average of roughly 20 hours per week in household work, compared to six hours for men. However, men spend more time in market work, so that overall leisure between the two groups is fairly close. On average, women do roughly three-quarters of the household work, while male labor supply accounts for close to two-thirds of couples' market work.

Looking next at couples' demographic characteristics, educational attainment for men and women is fairly similar, with high-school graduates numbering close to 85% of the sample and roughly 44% with some college experience. As might be expected given the time period and a sample of newly-weds, the couples are also fairly young, with an average age close to 25 for men and 23 for women. Most of the couples have not yet had children, with close to 75% of the sample reporting no children. Moreover, couples show a high degree of assortative mating by age and educational attainment, with 31% of the couples reporting that both partners had some college, and 44% reporting that neither partner had any college experience. Close to ninety percent of couples have less than a five-year difference in age.

Finally, as an additional test, I estimate the model on the sub-sample of parents, as well as on the full sample with property division laws as the policy variable of interest instead of unilateral divorce. As previously noted, if the gender differential in costs to divorce is higher among parents than non-parents, then one should see larger transfers among parents. Moreover, property division laws that are generally more favorable to women should be associated with higher transfers of leisure from men to women. Of course, fertility may be endogenous;

however, as will be discussed later, this selection should bias the results downward.

State property division laws fall into three categories: common law property division, equitable distribution and community property. Common law property states generally award property to the spouse who acquired the property, with most earnings going to the working spouse. In contrast, equitable distribution states use a loose set of guidelines to divide marital assets equitably, taking into account the length of the marriage as well as other factors, such as spouses' age, health and time spent caring for children instead of in market work. Finally, common law distribution states generally simply divide marital assets in half upon the dissolution of a marriage. Since a higher percentage of men were the primary earners when our data was collected, equitable distribution and community property laws are clearly more favorable to women than those in common law distribution states.

Results

Table five presents tobit results of unilateral divorce by gender on the share of time per week spent on home production and market work, as well as OLS regressions on average share of leisure per week. Model one, the baseline model, includes only unilateral divorce, gender and their interaction. Model two adds regional fixed effects and a year trend, while model three allows the time trend to be quadratic. Models four allows for gender-specific time trends to account for historic trends over time in household production and market work. Finally, model five allows for gender-specific time trends, demographic controls and regional fixed effects. We also estimated a variant of model 5 with state fixed effects; however, many states in our sample have fairly few observations, and estimates were implausibly large. As a result, the preferred model uses regional fixed effects. Table four illustrates the marginal effects of unilateral

divorce on the unconditional expected share of hours.5

Looking first at the share of household work, unilateral divorce laws show a consistent negative effect on women's share of household work across all specifications, and a positive effect on male's share of household work, although the specifications that include demographic covariates and gender-specific time trends are not statistically significant. After controlling for gender-specific time trends and demographic covariates, unilateral divorce is associated with an increase of about two percentage points in males' share of household work, with a commensurate decrease in females' share of household work. Moreover, males also show a statistically significant decrease in share of leisure following unilateral divorce laws across most specifications, with a decrease in the share of leisure of slightly less than one-half of one percentage point. If males face higher costs to divorce than females, then theory predicts that the male share of leisure will decline with unilateral divorce due to decreased friction to marital dissolution associated. In addition, models one through three show a significant positive effect of unilateral divorce on women's share of market work and a corresponding decrease in males' share of market work.

Tables seven and eight also indicate that unilateral divorce laws have a consistent, although not generally statistically significant, negative effect on total household work. In line with Stevenson's finding that unilateral divorce laws reduce marital investment in spousal education, children and household specialization, table eight indicates that unilateral divorce laws are associated with a decrease in total weekly household work of one to two hours per week. Reflecting the decrease in investment in home product, total household time spent in market work increases by one to three hours, as couples substitute market work for household production. No significant effects are seen on total household leisure hours.

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5   Marginal effects for leisure are included in the previous table, since leisure is not censored and therefore is estimated using OLS.

Moreover, there are significant gender differences in time spent in household work by gender in response to unilateral divorce laws. As tables nine and ten show and as might be expected given the increase in males share of household work following the passage of unilateral divorce laws, unilateral divorce laws are associated with an increase in males' household work, although this increase is not robust to the inclusion of gender-specific time trends and the inclusion of covariates. Consistent with Gray's results and with the overall decrease in total household work, females show a significant decrease in household work across all specifications, with a decrease in female hours spent in household work of roughly two hours.

Looking next at the effects on labor supply effects of unilateral divorce by gender, we see fewer differences. Both genders show a nominal increase in market work in response to unilateral divorce laws, although these effects are generally not statistically significant. Similarly, while unilateral divorce is associated with some increase in female leisure, these effects are not statistically significant.

Unilateral Divorce Law Effects Among Parents

If fathers face higher costs to divorce than mothers due to potential loss of custody, then one should expect relatively stronger effects of unilateral divorce laws on transfers among parents than in childless couples. Tables 11 through 16 illustrate the effects of unilateral divorce on parents. The increase in marginal effects of unilateral divorce among parents despite the decrease in sample size is striking. While males still have a much lower share of household work overall, unilateral divorce is associated with an increase in fathers' share of household work of roughly six percentage points, with statistically significant effects across all specifications.   As with the overall sample, this increase in paternal share of household work is combined with a decrease in share of leisure, with a loss of leisure share of between one to two

percentage points.

And, looking at hours spent in household work and market work by gender among parents, we see also significant increases in both household work and market work among men. The models indicate that fathers' expected weekly hours of household work increases from two to four hours in household work and from two to three hours in market work, while mothers' time spent in household work falls, although the decrease is not statistically significant. In contrast to the results of Genadek and coauthors (2007), tables 13 and 14 indicate that unilateral divorce laws have little effect on mother's time spent in market work, perhaps due to the smaller sample size. Finally, unilateral divorce laws are associated with large and significant decreases in leisure among fathers, as one might expect if fathers face particularly high costs to divorce relative to childless men. Table 13 indicates that fathers face a consistent marginal decrease in expected leisure per week of 4 to 5.5 hours a week. While mothers' hours of leisure increase with unilateral divorce laws, this increase is not statistically significant.

Tables 15 and 16 show the effects of unilateral divorce on overall household time use for parents. Consistent with the increase in both parents' market work with unilateral divorce and the large decrease in father's leisure, household market work increases significantly with unilateral divorce across all models, while household leisure falls. As might be expected given the opposite effects on parents' leisure household production, unilateral divorce has little effect on overall household production.

Of course, estimates on the population of parents may suffer from selection; however, this selection will downwardly bias the results. Literature indicates that fertility is associated with a stabilizing effect on marriage due in part to selection into fertility (Weiss and Willis, 1997; Svarer and Verner, 2004). This lower probability of divorce may give fathers less reason to behave strategically in response to policy changes that lower frictions to marital dissolution,

thereby biasing our results downward. In addition, unilateral divorce laws may affect fertility, as shown by Stevenson (2007) and Drewianka (2008). If unilateral divorce laws decrease overall fertility due to the perceived higher probability of divorce and if those couples with a better match are more likely to invest in the marriage and select into parenthood as is standard in the literature (Browning et al., 2010), then only the higher end of the match quality distribution will select into fertility under unilateral divorce, again leading to a downward bias in the behavioral response for parents presented in tables 11 through 16. If, on the other hand, some couples with a worse match have children to save the marriage, then this downward bias would be attenuated.

Property Division Laws

As an additional test of the bargaining response to divorce law, I examine the effects of property division laws on gender differences in household and market work, as well as leisure. Given that couples seem to behave strategically in response to unilateral divorce laws, with the spouse who stands to lose more from marital dissolution increasing transfers upon the passage of unilateral divorce laws, then one would expect to see strategic behavior in response to property division laws as well. Tables 17 through 20 show the effects of property division laws on spousal time use.

Starting with tables 17 and 18, we see effects that are consistent with higher male transfers in states with relatively generous property division laws. Equitable property and community property state laws, the policies which are more generally more generous to women, are associated with an increase in males' share of household work by three to five percentage points, as compared to the excluded category, common law distribution. Property division laws show no effect on share of market work or leisure. This pattern is replicated in tables 19 and 20, albeit with larger relative standard errors. Females in equitable distribution

states decrease their household work by roughly over an hour per week, with similar decreases in community property states, while males increase their time spent in household work by roughly the same amount. Over most specifications, market work increases in equitable distribution and community property states for both genders, although these effects are not statistically significant.6 Unfortunately, there is no over-time variation in state property division laws, however, so identification for these regressions is limited to cross-sectional data.

Conclusion

Previous literature indicates that unilateral divorce laws may decrease women's household work as well as overall marital investment. But the literature is silent on whether the decrease in women's household work represents a decrease in women's share of household work, or simply reflects an overall decrease in total household work with unilateral divorce laws. Moreover, no literature has examined the effect that unilateral divorce laws may have on male household production and transfers of household work or leisure.

This research indicates that the decrease in household work among females can be attributed primarily to a decrease in females' share of household work, rather than an overall decrease in total household work. Moreover, these effects are largest among parents; given prevailing custody arrangements at the time, fathers faced particularly high costs of divorce which may contribute to the stronger effects among couples with children.

While this research adds to the already substantial literature supporting bargaining models of household behavior, it also indicates that household production may be an important source of that bargaining power (Pollak, 2005) and that men's behavioral response to unilateral divorce laws and other family law is an important and overlooked margin in policy research.

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6 Chiappori et al. (2002) find that community property laws are associated with a decrease in female and increase in male labor supply.

Given the relatively large increases in fathers' household work and decreased leisure following unilateral divorce laws, as well as the male increase in household work among more generous property distribution states, this research suggests that men, and fathers in particular, may behave strategically in response to changes in marital policy.

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Table One: Percent of Respondents Who Wanted the Marriage to End by Gender[7]

Question	Gender	Percentage by Gender: Total Sample	Percentage by Gender: Non-Parents	Percentage by Gender: Parents
R WANTED MARR END/ PARTNER DID NOT	Male	14.0%	17.1%	13.0%
	Female	38.3%	29.5%	40.4%
R WANTED MARR END MORE THAN PARTNER	Male	14.0%	22.9%	11.3%
	Female	22.9%	24.4%	22.5%
BOTH WANTED MARR TO END	Male	26.3%	15.7%	29.6%
	Female	19.0%	23.1%	18.1%
PARTNER WANTED MARR TO END MORE THAN R	Male	15.3%	18.6%	14.3%
	Female	9.0%	9.0%	9.1%
PARTNER WANTED MARR TO END/R DID NOT	Male	30.3%	25.7%	31.7%
	Female	10.7%	14.1%	9.9%
	N	720	148	572

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7   Data from National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), Wave 2, 1992-1994. Numbers reported are the percentage by gender in each category.

Table Two: Overall Happiness Following Divorce by Gender[8]

Overall Happiness Following Separation	Gender	Percentage by Gender: Total Sample	Percentage by Gender: Non-Parents	Percentage by Gender: Parents
MUCH WORSE	Male	6.0%	4.2%	6.5%
	Female	3.4%	2.5%	3.6%
SOMEWHAT WORSE	Male	11.1%	5.6%	12.7%
	Female	8.5%	6.3%	9.0%
SAME	Male	17.7%	14.1%	18.8%
	Female	10.6%	8.8%	11.0%
SOMEWHAT BETTER	Male	26.3%	31.0%	24.9%
	Female	21.1%	16.3%	22.2%
MUCH BETTER	Male	38.9%	45.1%	37.1%
	Female	56.2%	65.0%	54.2%
	N	761	151	610

8   Author's calculations. Data from National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), Wave 2, 1992-1994.

Table Three: Dependent Variable Summary Statistics

		Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Hours/Wk Household Work	Head	6.3	6.83	1585
	Wife	19.1	12.8	1679
	Wife's Share HH Work	0.75	0.2	
	Household Total	25.4	15.5	3355
Hrs/Wk Market Work	Head	39	13.8	1839
	Wife	22.6	16.3	1840
	Wife's Share Market Work	0.34	0.23	
	Household Total	61.4	22.3	3682
Hrs/Wk Leisure	Head	121.8	16.3	1569
	Wife	125.4	18.3	1663
	Wife's Share Leisure	0.51	0.04	
	Household Total	248.4	24.7	3303

Table Four: Summary Statistics

		Mean	Standard Deviation
HS Degree	Head	0.84	0.37
	Wife	0.87	0.33
Some College	Head	0.44	0.5
	Wife	0.45	0.5
Age	Head	24.6	4.1
	Wife	22.8	3.9
Number of Children		0.35	0.72

Table Five: Percent of Household Work, Market Market Work and Leisure Regressed on Unilateral Divorce by Gender[9]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Pct Hrs/Wk HH Work	Unilateral*Male	0.060*** (0.018)	0.062*** (0.018)	0.061** (0.018)	0.021 (0.018)	0.019 (0.018)
	Unilateral*Fem	-0.059*** (0.018)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.017)
	Male	-0.585*** (0.023)	-0.584*** (0.024)	-0.584*** (0.024)	-	-
	Pseudo R-sq	0.75	0.76	0.76	0.85	0.92
Pct Hrs/Wk Market Work	Unilateral*Male	-0.026** (0.013)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.024** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.013)
	Unilateral*Fem	0.030** (0.014)	0.028** (0.014)	0.028** (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.014 (0.015)
	Male	0.407*** (0.013)	0.403*** (0.015)	0.403*** (0.013)	-	-
	Pseudo R-sq	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.37
Pct Hrs/Wk Leisure	Unilateral*Male	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.004* (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
	Unilateral*Fem	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)
	Gender	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.009** (0.003)	-	-
	R-sq	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X		
	Quadratic Year Trend			X		
	Gender-specific Year trend				X	X
	Gender-specific quadratic year trend				X	X
	Covariates					X

Table Six: Marginal Effects on the Expected Percent of Hours of Unilateral Divorce by Gender[10]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
HH Work	Unilateral*Male	0.060*** (0.017)	0.061** (0.018)	0.060** (0.018)	0.021 (0.017)	0.019 (0.017)
	Unilateral*Fem	-0.058*** (0.017)	-0.055*** (0.017)	-0.055*** (0.018)	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.016)
Hrs/Wk Mkt Work	Unilateral*Male	-0.025** (0.011)	-0.024** (0.011)	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)
	Unilateral*Fem	0.029*** (0.013)	0.027** (0.013)	0.027** (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.013 (0.015)
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X		
	Quadratic Year Trend			X		
	Gender specific year trend				X	X
	Gender specific quadratic year trend				X	X
	Demographic controls					X

Table Seven: Total Household Work, Market Market Work and Leisure Regressed on Unilateral Divorce[11]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Total Hrs/Wk HH Work	Unilateral	-2.16** (0.97)	-0.76 (1.05)	-1.45 (1.03)	-1.14 (0.96)
	Pseudo R-sq	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.010
Total Hrs/Wk Market Work	Unilateral	3.03** (1.26)	1.53 (1.55)	1.91 (1.54)	1.10 (1.31)
	Pseudo R-sq	0.001	0.003	0.004	0.02
Total Hrs/Wk Leisure	Unilateral	-0.68 (1.37)	-0.82 (1.54)	-0.36 (1.52)	0.50 (1.53)
	R-sq	0.000	0.02	0.02	0.06
	Region FE		X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X	X
	Quadratic Year Trend			X	X
	Covariates				X

[11] Data clustered by state. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. The unit of analysis is all households of married couples within the first two years of marriage for whom data was listed for both partners. *** indicates significant at the 1% level. ** indicates significant at the 5% level. * indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table Eight: Marginal Effects of Unilateral Divorce on Expected Total Household Work, Market Work and Leisure[12]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Total Hrs/Wk Household Work	-2.05** (0.92)	-0.72 (1.00)	-1.38 (0.98)	-1.08 (0.91)
Total Hrs/Wk Mkt Work	3.032* (1.26)	1.53 (1.55)	1.90 (1.54)	1.09 (1.37)
Region Fixed Effect		X	X	X
Year Trend		X	X	X
Quadratic Year Trend			X	X
Covariates				X

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[12] *** indicates significant at the 1% level. ** indicates significant at the 5% level. * indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table Nine: Household Work, Market Market Work and Leisure Regressed on Unilateral Divorce by Gender[13]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Hrs/Wk HH Work	Unilateral*Male	1.37** (0.59)	1.83*** (0.65)	1.42** (0.63)	0.40 (0.60)	0.53 (0.69)
	Unilateral*Fem	-2.77*** (0.87)	-2.21*** (0.85)	-2.59*** (0.86)	-1.71** (0.86)	-1.49* (0.80)
	Gender	-15.74*** (0.84)	-15.65*** (0.84)	-15.69*** (0.84)	-	-
	Pseudo R-sq	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Hrs/Wk Market Work	Unilateral*Male	1.06 (0.75)	0.24 (0.89)	0.47 (0.89)	1.17 (0.86)	0.68 (0.75)
	Unilateral*Fem	2.42** (0.99)	1.50 (1.12)	1.72 (1.11)	1.00 (1.12)	0.66 (1.07)
	Gender	18.37*** (0.63)	18.25*** (0.63)	18.25*** (0.62)	-	-
	Pseudo R-sq	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
Hrs/Wk Leisure	Unilateral*Male	-0.76 (0.77)	-0.78 (0.88)	-0.58 (0.88)	-0.45 (0.87)	0.24 (0.94)
	Unilateral*Fem	0.89 (1.14)	0.94 (1.16)	1.12 (1.15)	1.01 (1.17)	1.32 (1.18)
	Male	-2.83 (0.88)	-2.83*** (0.87)	-2.81*** (0.87)	-	-
	R-sq	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X		
	Quadratic Year Trend			X		
	Gender-specific Year trend				X	X
	Gender-specific quadratic year trend				X	X
	Covariates					X

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[13] Data clustered by state. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. The sample includes all married females and males within the first two years of marriage for whom data was listed for both partners. *** indicates significant at the 1% level. ** indicates significant at the 5% level. * indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table Ten: Marginal Effects on Expected Hours of Market Work, Household Work and Leisure of Unilateral Divorce[14]

		Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Hrs/Wk HH Work	Unilateral*Male	1.19** (0.52)	1.60*** (0.58)	1.24** (0.56)	0.35 (0.53)	0.47 (0.61)
	Unilateral*Fem	-2.35*** (0.73)	-1.88*** (0.71)	-2.21*** (0.72)	-1.47*** (0.73)	-1.30* (0.69)
Hrs/Wk Mkt Work	Unilateral*Male	1.02 (0.73)	0.23 (0.86)	0.45 (0.86)	1.13 (0.83)	0.70 (0.73)
	Unilateral*Fem	2.34*** (0.96)	1.45 (1.09)	1.67 (1.08)	0.96 (1.08)	0.64 (1.04)
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X		
	Quadratic Year Trend			X		
	Gender specific year trend				X	X
	Gender specific quadratic year trend				X	X
	Demographic controls					X

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14. *** indicates significant at the 1% level. ** indicates significant at the 5% level. * indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 11: Percent of Household Work, Market Market Work and Leisure Regressed on Unilateral Divorce on Couples with Children by Gender[15]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Pct Hrs/Wk HH Work	Unilateral*Male	0.090*** (0.023)	0.092*** (0.024)	0.090*** (0.024)	0.061*** (0.020)	0.061*** (0.021)
	Unilateral*Fem	-0.082*** (0.026)	-0.081*** (0.026)	-0.083*** (0.026)	-0.059*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.021)
	Male	-0.706*** (0.030)	-0.707*** (0.030)	-0.708*** (0.030)	-	-
	Pseudo R-sq	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.66	0.66
Pct Hrs/Wk Market Work	Unilateral*Male	-0.030 (0.043)	-0.036 (0.042)	-0.036 (0.042)	-0.021 (0.043)	-0.018 (0.044)
	Unilateral*Fem	0.028 (0.043)	0.019 (0.044)	0.019 (0.044)	0.004 (0.046)	0.007 (0.045)
	Male	0.718*** (0.059)	0.714*** (0.059)	0.714*** (0.060)	-	-
	Pseudo R-sq	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.34
Pct Hrs/Wk Leisure	Unilateral*Male	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.014** (0.006)
	Unilateral*Fem	0.011* (0.006)	0.012* (0.006)	0.012* (0.006)	0.013** (0.006)	0.013** (0.006)
	Gender	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	-	-
	R-sq	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X		
	Quadratic Year Trend			X		
	Gender-specific Year trend				X	X
	Gender-specific quadratic year trend				X	X
	Covariates					X

Table 12: Marginal Effects on the Expected Percent of Hours of Unilateral Divorce on Couples with Children by Gender[16]

		Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
HH Work	Unilateral*Male	0.089*** (0.023)	0.090*** (0.023)	0.088*** (0.023)	0.060*** (0.020)	0.060*** (0.020)
	Unilateral*Fem	-0.079*** (0.025)	-0.079*** (0.025)	-0.080*** (0.025)	-0.058** (0.021)	-0.055*** (0.020)
Hrs/Wk Mkt Work	Unilateral*Male	-0.028 (0.038)	-0.033 (0.038)	-0.033 (0.038)	-0.019 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.040)
	Unilateral*Fem	0.025 (0.040)	0.018 (0.041)	0.019 (0.041)	0.004 (0.042)	0.006 (0.042)
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X		
	Quadratic Year Trend			X		
	Gender specific year trend				X	X
	Gender specific quadratic year trend				X	X
	Demographic controls					X

Table 13: Effects of Unilateral Divorce on Parents' Household Work, Market Work and Leisure by Gender[17]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Hrs/Wk HH Work	Unilateral*Male	3.58*** (1.37)	4.34*** (1.63)	3.91*** (1.59)	3.00** (1.48)	3.29* (1.79)
	Unilateral*Fem	-2.70 (2.25)	-2.01 (1.90)	-2.44 (1.82)	-1.77 (1.84)	-0.47 (1.76)
	Gender	-23.50*** (1.65)	-23.57*** (1.67)	-23.64*** (1.66)	-	-
	Pseudo R-sq	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Hrs/Wk Market Work	Unilateral*Male	1.66 (1.85)	3.06* (1.70)	3.12* (1.67)	3.93** (1.63)	4.00** (1.62)
	Unilateral*Fem	1.73 (2.51)	3.08 (2.05)	3.14 (2.00)	2.30 (2.11)	1.04 (2.04)
	Gender	26.99*** (1.78)	26.93*** (1.78)	26.93*** (1.78)	-	-
	Pseudo R-sq	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Hrs/Wk Leisure	Unilateral*Male	-4.12** (1.63)	-5.63*** (1.87)	-5.45*** (1.90)	-5.65*** (1.82)	-5.51*** (1.80)
	Unilateral*Fem	2.49 (2.45)	1.02 (2.12)	1.20 (2.04)	1.39 (2.06)	1.45 (1.98)
	Male	-2.72 (1.80)	-2.68 (1.81)	-2.66 (1.80)	-	-
	R-sq	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X		
	Quadratic Year Trend			X		
	Gender-specific Year trend				X	X
	Gender-specific quadratic year trend				X	X
	Covariates					X

[17]Data clustered by state. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. The sample includes all married parents within the first two years of marriage for whom data was listed for both partners. *** indicates significant at the 1% level. ** indicates significant at the 5% level. * indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 14: Marginal Effects on Expected Hours of Market Work, Household Work and Leisure of Unilateral Divorce on Couples with Children[18]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Hrs/Wk HH Work	Unilateral*Male	3.12*** (1.10)	3.81*** (1.46)	3.43** (1.41)	2.62** (1.30)	2.92* (1.60)
	Unilateral*Fem	-2.27* (1.85)	-1.70 (1.60)	-2.06 (1.52)	-1.51 (1.55)	-0.41 (1.54)
Hrs/Wk Mkt Work	Unilateral*Male	1.50 (1.69)	2.79* (1.57)	2.85* (1.55)	3.61** (1.52)	3.69** (1.51)
	Unilateral*Fem	1.57 (2.29)	2.81 (1.88)	2.87 (1.84)	2.11 (1.94)	0.94 (1.87)
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X		
	Quadratic Year Trend			X		
	Gender specific year trend				X	X
	Gender specific quadratic year trend				X	X
	Demographic controls					X

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[18] *** indicates significant at the 1% level. ** indicates significant at the 5% level. * indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 15: Total Household Work, Market Market Work and Leisure of Couples with Children Regressed on Unilateral Divorce[19]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 5
Total Hrs/Wk HH Work	Unilateral	-1.03 (2.83)	0.58 (2.77)	0.06 (2.60)	1.04 (2.67)
	Pseudo R-sq	0.000	0.005	0.006	0.013
Total Hrs/Wk Market Work	Unilateral	2.76 (2.96)	5.42** (2.32)	5.51** (2.28)	4.54** (2.09)
	Pseudo R-sq	0.000	0.003	0.003	0.013
Total Hrs/Wk Leisure	Unilateral	-1.11 (2.89)	-5.09** (2.28)	-4.72** (2.21)	-4.67* (2.39)
	R-sq	0.000	0.01	0.01	0.06
	Region FE		X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X	X
	Quadratic Year Trend			X	X
	Covariates				X

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[19] Data clustered by state. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. The unit of analysis is households with married parents within the first two years of marriage for whom data was listed for both partners. *** indicates significant at the 1% level. ** indicates significant at the 5% level. * indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 16: Marginal Effects of Unilateral Divorce on Expected Total Household Work, Market Work and Leisure of Couples with Children[20]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 5
Total Hrs/Wk Household Work	-1.07 (2.69)	0.55 (2.65)	0.06 (2.49)	0.99 (2.56)
Total Hrs/Wk Mkt Work	2.74 (2.92)	5.38** (2.31)	5.47** (2.26)	4.52** (2.07)
Region Fixed Effect		X	X	X
Year Trend		X	X	X
Quadratic Year Trend			X	X
Covariates				X

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[20] *** indicates significant at the 1% level. ** indicates significant at the 5% level. * indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 17: Percent of Household Work, Market Market Work and Leisure Regressed on Property Division Laws by Gender[21]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Pct Hrs/Wk HH Work	Equitable Dist*Male	0.043** (0.021)	0.043** (0.021)	0.043** (0.021)	0.037* (0.019)	0.028 (0.020)
	Community Property*Male	0.047** (0.023)	0.052** (0.024)	0.052** (0.024)	0.035* (0.021)	0.019 (0.024)
	Equitable Dist*Fem	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.045** (0.020)	-0.041** (0.018)	-0.033* (0.018)
	Community Property*Fem	-0.041 (0.026)	-0.036 (0.025)	-0.036 (0.024)	-0.02 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.024)
	Pseudo R-sq	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.85	0.93
Pct Hrs/Wk Market Work	Equitable Dist*Male	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.016)
	Community Property*Male	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.000 (0.014)	0.002 (0.012)
	Equitable Dist*Fem	0.013 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	0.014 (0.015)	0.012 (0.017)
	Community Property*Fem	0.012 (0.017)	0.013 (0.016)	0.014 (0.018)	0.007 (0.018)	0.012 (0.019)
	Pseudo R-sq	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.37
Pct Hrs/Wk Leisure	Equitable Dist*Male	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.008 (0.003)
	Community Prop*Male	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
	Equitable Dist*Fem	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)
	Community Prop*Fem	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.004)
	R-sq	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year		X	X		
	Year^2			X		
	Gender-specific Year and Year^2				X	X
	Covariates					X

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[21]Data clustered by state. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. The sample includes all married parents within the first two years of marriage for whom data was listed for both partners. Significance as listed previously.

Table 18: Marginal Effects on the Expected Percent of Hours of Property Division Laws by Gender[22]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
HH Work	Equitable Dist*Male	0.042** (0.021)	0.042** (0.021)	0.042** (0.021)	0.036* (0.019)	0.028 (0.020)
	Community Property*Male	0.047** (0.022)	0.052** (0.024)	0.052** (0.024)	0.035* (0.021)	0.019 (0.024)
	Equitable Dist*Fem	-0.043*** (0.020)	-0.044*** (0.020)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.041** (0.018)	-0.033* (0.019)
	Community Property*Fem	-0.041 (0.025)	-0.036 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.024)	-0.020 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.023)
Hrs/Wk Mkt Work	Equitable Dist*Male	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.015)
	Community Property*Male	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.000 (0.013)	0.002 (0.012)
	Equitable Dist*Fem	0.013 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.014 (0.015)	0.012 (0.016)
	Community Property*Fem	0.011 (0.016)	0.013 (0.017)	0.013 (0.017)	0.007 (0.017)	0.011 (0.018)
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X		
	Quadratic Year Trend			X		
	Gender specific year trend				X	X
	Gender specific quadratic year trend				X	X
	Demographic controls					X

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[22] *** indicates significant at the 1% level. ** indicates significant at the 5% level. * indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 19: Hours Household Work, Market Market Work and Leisure Regressed on Property Division Laws by Gender[23]

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Hrs/Wk HH Work	Equitable Dist*Male	1.10 (0.70)	1.35** (0.56)	1.14* (0.63)	1.02 (0.65)	1.05 (0.73)
	Community Property*Male	0.49 (0.55)	1.39* (0.86)	1.31 (0.88)	0.89 (0.76)	0.96 (0.93)
	Equitable Dist*Fem	-1.53 (0.98)	-1.28 (0.92)	-1.49 (0.99)	-1.45 (0.97)	-0.82 (0.91)
	Community Property*Fem	-2.60** (1.29)	-1.70 (1.24)	-1.76 (1.20)	-1.33 (1.13)	-0.62 (1.29)
	Pseudo R-sq	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Hrs/Wk Market Work	Equitable Dist*Male	0.57 (1.05)	0.30 (1.12)	0.40 (1.13)	0.35 (1.10)	-0.80 (1.23)
	Community Property*Male	0.23 (0.74)	-0.03 (0.86)	0.02 (0.84)	0.29 (0.85)	0.17 (0.80)
	Equitable Dist*Fem	1.38 (1.29)	1.11 (1.33)	1.21 (1.35)	1.25 (1.34)	0.13 (1.45)
	Community Property*Fem	1.31 (1.16)	1.06 (1.33)	1.11 (1.30)	0.83 (1.29)	0.93 (0.94)
	Pseudo R-sq	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
Hrs/Wk Leisure	Equitable Dist*Male	-1.47* (0.88)	-1.74* (0.87)	-1.65* (0.86)	-1.64* (0.87)	-0.27 (1.05)
	Community Prop*Male	0.94 (0.77)	0.40 (1.06)	0.44 (1.08)	0.52 (1.05)	0.83 (1.48)
	Equitable Dist*Fem	0.01 (1.24)	-0.32 (1.14)	-0.22 (1.14)	-0.21 (1.14)	0.27 (1.48)
	Community Prop*Fem	1.67 (1.39)	1.13 (1.27)	1.17 (1.27)	1.10 (1.25)	0.41 (1.27)
	R-sq	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year		X	X		
	Year^2			X		
	Gender-specific Year and Year^2				X	X
	Covariates					X

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[23] Data clustered by state. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. The sample includes all married parents within the first two years of marriage for whom data was listed for both partners. Significance as listed previously.

Table 20: Marginal Effects on Expected Work Hours of Property Division Laws by Gender[24]

		Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
HH Work	Equitable Dist*Male	0.96 (0.62)	1.19** (0.59)	1.00* (0.55)	0.90 (0.57)	0.93 (0.65)
	Community Property*Male	0.42 (0.47)	1.22 (0.77)	1.15 (0.78)	0.78 (0.67)	0.86 (0.83)
	Equitable Dist*Fem	-1.31 (0.83)	-1.09 (0.78)	-1.28 (0.84)	-1.25 (0.83)	-0.72 (0.79)
	Community Property*Fem	-2.20** (1.07)	-1.45 (1.05)	-1.50 (1.00)	-1.15 (0.96)	-0.54 (1.12)
Hrs/Wk Mkt Work	Equitable Dist*Male	0.55 (1.01)	0.29 (1.08)	0.39 (1.09)	0.34 (1.07)	-0.78 (1.19)
	Community Property*Male	0.22 (0.72)	-0.03 (0.83)	0.02 (0.81)	0.28 (0.82)	0.17 (0.77)
	Equitable Dist*Fem	1.33 (1.26)	1.07 (1.29)	1.17 (1.31)	1.21 (1.30)	0.13 (1.41)
	Community Property*Fem	1.26 (1.13)	1.02 (1.29)	1.08 (1.26)	0.80 (1.25)	0.91 (0.91)
	Region FE		X	X	X	X
	Year trend		X	X		
	Quadratic Year Trend			X		
	Gender specific year trend				X	X
	Gender specific quadratic year trend				X	X
	Demographic controls					X

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[24] *** indicates significant at the 1% level. ** indicates significant at the 5% level. * indicates significant at the 10% level.