EXPLAINING THE MUSLIM EMPLOYMENT GAP IN WESTERN EUROPE: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL EFFECTS AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS PENALTIES*

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Abstract:

It is well-documented that Muslims experience economic disadvantages in Western European labor markets. However, few studies comprehensively test individual-level explanations for the Muslim employment gap. Using data from the European Social Survey, this research note briefly examines the role of individual-level differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in mediating employment differences. Results reveal that human capital, migration background, religiosity, cultural values, and perceived discrimination jointly explain about 40% of the employment variance between Muslims and non-Muslims. Model specifications for first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants reveal a similar pattern, with migration background and perceived discrimination being of key relevance in mediating employment difference. While individual-level effects are indeed relevant, unexplained variance suggests that symbolic boundaries against Islam may still translate into tangible ethno-religious penalties.

Keywords: Muslims, Europe, Employment, Economic Integration, Religion, Immigration

Word Count: 5,700

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1. INTRODUCTION

Economic disadvantages among Muslims, who constitute a substantial share among immigrants in Europe (Pew Research Center, 2012), have received wide attention in the media and within academic scholarship. It is indeed striking that the most disadvantaged migrant groups across European labor markets, such as North Africans in France, Turks in Germany or Pakistanis in the UK, come from Islamic countries of origin. Numerous studies in the burgeoning literature on "ethnic" penalties have amply documented that Muslims tend to have lower rates of labor force participation, employment, and occupational attainment (Bisin, et al., 2011: 7, Cheung, 2014, Connor, In Press, Connor and Koenig, 2013, Lessar-Phillips, Fibbi, and Wanner 2012, van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004, see also Pichler 2011). To be sure, the migration background of the Muslim population makes it notoriously hard to strictly distinguish ethnic from religious penalties; among religiously homogenous immigrant groups such as Moroccans, Pakistanis, or Turks it is virtually impossible to distinguish ethnic from religious penalties. Yet, there are now several methodologically innovative studies which demonstrate that religious difference, being Muslim in particular, does indeed have an independent effect upon labor market performance (Khattab, 2009, Lindley, 2002, Model and Lin, 2002). Thus, Heath and Martin (2013) in their standard-setting study on labor market performance in the United Kingdom demonstrate a strong Muslim penalty for men and women from various religiously heterogeneous ethnic groups in terms of economic activity as well as employment.

Such economic disadvantages of Muslims are of crucial relevance for European societies. If indeed religious differences are linked to inequalities on the labor market, this might indicate the

emergence of an ethno-religious underclass, with far-reaching potential repercussions for cleavage structures in European democracies (Cesari, 2009, Kurth, 2007, Parekh, 2012). It would confirm that the "barrier", according to some authors, some Muslim immigrants have faced in Europe (unlike in the US, see Foner and Alba, 2008) not only concerns questions of symbolic and institutional recognition of Islam, but also translates deeply into individuals' access to material resources and socio-structural positions.

Of particular importance are repeatedly documented employment gaps for Muslim groups (Aleksynska and Algan, 2010, Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010; van Tubergen et al. 2004; for Germany see Kanas et al. 2011; for France, Silbermann et al. 2007; for Britain, Heath and Martin 2013 and Cheung, 2014). To some degree, these disadvantages are certainly due to the migration history of post-war Western Europe (Lucassen, et al., 2006). Many Muslims arrived as labor migrants, but after the mid-1970s economic crisis found themselves unemployed without the necessary skills or language ability to succeed on an increasingly competitive labor market. However, compared to other labor migrant groups, Muslims have faced particular difficulties in staying employed after the mid-1970s economic crisis. Even second-generation Muslims who have higher educational credentials than their parents (albeit often still lower than European peers with and without migration background) remain far more likely to be unemployed (Lessard-Phillips, et al., 2012, Reisel, et al., 2012).

Despite these by now well-established descriptive findings, the current research literature is less conclusive on how actually to explain the Muslim employment gap. Heath and Martin (2013: 1006, 1026), while providing the currently most definite test for the existence of a Muslim

penalty only hint at potential explanations for this aggregate pattern. After all, various social mechanisms might be at work in producing lower employment rates among Muslims. On the one hand, Muslims may differ from the general population in terms of human capital, migration biographies, or religious values, thus making it less probable for them to search and find jobs regardless of public perceptions of Islam. On the other hand, Muslims may suffer from discrimination by employers tending, whether out of subjective prejudice or instrumental calculation, to discard their job applications.

In this article we build upon previous studies by testing several hypotheses for the Muslim employment gap, using pooled data from the European Social Survey (ESS). Theoretically, we review alternative arguments that explain the employment gap by individual-level differences and stress that salient symbolic boundaries against Islam should be expected to impact upon socio-structural integration at the group level. Having introduced our data and methods, we put these theoretical arguments to an empirical test. We estimate models of employment comparing Muslims to non-Muslims in Europe, before adding separate model specifications for first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants. Our analyses show that about 40% of the employment variance between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe can be explained by measured individual-level differences. Of these individual-level differences, the greatest variance is due to migration-related factors. However, a substantial portion of employment differences between Muslims and non-Muslims is also due to individual perceptions of discrimination, particularly among second-generation Muslims. In sum, our findings lend partial support to the assumption that "bright" symbolic boundaries have tangible effects for access to material resources.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

To explain the Muslim employment gap, we draw upon our theoretical reformulation of Foner's and Alba's (2008) metaphor of religion as "bridge" to immigrant integration (Connor and Koenig, 2013:7). Within that conceptual framework, employment gaps among religious minorities would be explained by a mechanism of social closure in which publicly salient or "bright" religious boundaries are activated to limit access to material resources in the receiving society (for conceptual background see also Fox and Guglielmo, 2012). Given the salience of symbolic boundaries against Islam in the context of secularized European societies with remnants of Christian privilege and strong anti-Muslim attitudes (e.g. Strabag and Listhauc 2008), belonging to Muslim minorities would thus result in barriers to structural assimilation among first- and second- generation immigrants, regardless of actual religious practice. In the following, we further elaborate this argument about ethno-religious "penalties" by relating it to a number of alternative, individual-level explanations for employment disparities between Muslims and the general population, derived from the standard literature on immigrants' socio-economic assimilation (Heath et al., 2008; van Tubergen, et al. 2004).

The *first* alternative explanation for employment gaps between Muslims and non-Muslims evidently focuses upon individuals' human capital. Most Muslim immigrants entering Europe have come from a lower socio-economic class background compared to the European population as a whole and sometimes to other immigrant groups. Differences in parental socio-economic background and education could indeed explain a substantial proportion of the variance between Muslim and non-Muslim employment rates and therefore need to be taken into account in any

analysis of ethno-religious penalties (Heath, et al., 2008). Moreover, given that many second-generation Muslim youth grew up in economically disadvantaged households, this same set of human capital explanations could carry through to children of immigrants as well, despite their education in the receiving society. Only if religious differences persist after controlling for individuals' human capital could mechanisms of social closure at all be expected as operating.

The *second* group of factors potentially explaining the Muslim employment gap in Europe is related to migration more explicitly. Typically, the longer an immigrant has spent time in the receiving context, the greater their economic opportunities, including employment (Chiswick, 2005 [1979]). Not only could it be expected that foreign-born persons having lived longer in the receiving country out-perform more recent arrivals, the second generation can also be expected to be in a better economic position than their parents. Additionally, other migration related variables like citizenship in the country of residence as well as language ability in the national language(s) have been shown to contribute to the economic success of immigrants (Lessard-Phillips, et al., 2012). In any event, if one wanted to attribute the Muslim employment gap to religious boundaries, one would at first have to take into account such migration related factors.

A *third* group of factors that merits discussion concerns cultural aspects such as religious practices and value attitudes of individual Muslims. Thus, it could be the case that the Muslim employment gap is related to European Muslims' typically higher level of religious participation and identification (see for review Voas and Fleischmann, 2012). Time-intensive forms of religious practices are sometimes argued to be indicative of strong ethnic orientations which might make entry into the labor market more difficult. However, it is also conceivable that

regardless of religious practice there are individual-level differences in cultural value attitudes, for instance in terms of achievement-oriented individualism as opposed to conservative collectivism, as found in various international surveys comparing Muslims and non-Muslims (see Norris and Inglehart, 2012). Such value differences might explain differential employment rates on highly competitive labor markets. In any event, scrutinizing religious practices and value attitudes is crucial in assessing the amount of economic disparities associated with religious affiliation as such.

While we stress that these three groups of individual-level factors specify important mechanisms behind access to employment, our "barrier" argument assumes that they only insufficiently explain the Muslim employment gap. We thus expect still to find substantial Muslim penalties even after controlling for these factors. Now, salient symbolic boundaries against Islam could affect employment outcomes in various ways. On the one hand, they may prompt directly discriminatory behavior by employers. The methodologically most refined study to date to assess this mechanism, a job audit experiment accompanied by survey-research and group interviews, has found that immigrant Muslim-sounding names were significantly less likely to receive an interview than immigrant Christian-sounding names with the same set of qualifications (Adida, et al., 2010; (for qualitative evidence see also Mitbøen, 2013). On the other hand, salient boundaries may prompt self-perceived discrimination which, in turn, might make people less likely to even apply for jobs due to what Heath and Martin (2013: 1006) call a "chill factor". While discriminatory behavior is impossible to measure with survey-data, self-perceived discrimination should be included as a *fourth* set of individual-level variables in the empirical analysis. At a minimum, if the Muslim employment gap persists after controlling for all four

groups of individual-level variables, further research in dynamics of ethno-religious discrimination would be warranted.

3. DATA AND METHODS

To better understand employment penalties of Muslims in Europe, we analyze data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS, an award-winning data collection project based on face-to-face interviews and obtaining around 70% or higher response rates in each country, is particularly well suited for our research question. As a general population sample for several European countries, it allows comparing non-Muslims with Muslims living in these countries. Of course, the ESS also faces certain data limitations. First, interviews were only conducted in the countries' official languages. This might bias descriptive rates of employment among migrants to the more acculturated ones (Lagana, et al., 2011); however, such bias should be less of a problem when analyzing underlying individual-level mechanisms for the Muslim employment gap. Second, to obtain a sufficient number of Muslim cases, ESS data is pooled across countries and survey rounds (2002-2012). Since the situation of Muslims differs markedly across countries, this is less than ideal; however, the ESS data still provides some preliminary evidence of the Muslim employment gap and its correlates for Europe as a whole. Given the literature's focus on the situation of Muslims in Western Europe, we restrict our analysis to the EU15+2 countries (European Union's 15 member countries prior to 2004 enlargement plus Norway and Switzerland).

The major *outcome variable* in our analyses is employment among those indicating they are part of the labor force. To distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims, including both Christians, others and religiously unaffiliated, we rely on respondents' self-identification with Islam when asked for their religious affiliation. Analysis is limited to those of working ages, 25 to 64 years. Models are presented for men and women combined since sample sizes for some Muslim groups become too small for separate analyses by sex.[1]

To test the alternative individual-level hypotheses explaining employment differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, we rely on several *mediating variables*. To assess the relevance of human capital, respondents' education is measured by a recoded binary variable indicating some post-secondary education. Parental SES is measured as at least one parent working in a professional occupation when the respondent was fourteen years old and at least one parent employed, also during childhood. To account for migration background, we use time in country for the foreign-born or second-generation immigrant (born in country of residence with at least one foreign-born parent) all with no migration background as the reference category. Additional migration background variables are foreign citizenship and speaking a foreign language at home.[2] Religiosity is measured by praying daily or more often, attending religious services monthly or more often and a one to ten point scale measuring the self-assessed importance of religion in one's life. We operationalize value orientations by using Schwartz's four value categories: openness to change, self-enhancement, conservation, and self-transcendence

[1] A small number of Muslim cases does not permit the presentation of findings by sex, especially for the small number of Muslim women in the labor force. Nonetheless, separate model specifications for men and women were conducted and findings were similar to those presented for men and women combined, albeit with less statistical significance due to sample sizes.

[2] Some migration related variables are omitted in later generation-specific models as the non-Muslim reference group in these generation-specific models has no migration background.

(Schwartz, 2003). Each of these broad value orientations contain several measures based on several survey questions. For example 'openness to change' measures underlying values of hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction while 'conservation' is comprised of values indicating security, conformity and tradition. Questions measuring achievement and power constitute the value orientation of 'self-enhancement' while 'self-transcendence is comprised of values indicating universalism and benevolence. Schwarz's value index has been tested in several countries and is a useful cross-cultural value index measuring value orientations (Schwartz et al. 2001; Schwartz, 2003). The value variables were computed following the recommendations of Schwartz to ESS investigators by taking the individual mean of various (four to six) indicators for each value category. For ease of interpretation, the original indicators were reverse-coded; therefore, a larger number indicates higher proximity to the value under consideration. Finally, perceived boundaries are measured by "discrimination", referring to whether respondents perceived themselves to be part of a discriminated group.

Furthermore, several control variables known to affect employment are included in models, such as sex, age, marital status the presence of minor children in the home and year of survey. Unfortunately, ESS data does not permit strictly separating out "ethnic" from "religious" penalties using Heath and Martin's (2013) strategy. However, by including a variable on "ethnic minority" denoting the self-identification of belonging to an ethnic minority in the respondent's country of residence we attempt to account for potential overlap between these two dimensions of categorical difference.[3] All descriptive analyses use a combination of design and population weights. Multivariate analyses use country fixed effects to account for unobserved differences in

[3] More refined ethnic self-categorization as used in many datasets from the United Kingdom, including the Annual Population Surveys used by Heath and Martin (2013), are unavailable in the ESS as, in fact, in most other national survey datasets in Western Europe.

how institutional contexts (e.g. countries' welfare and citizenships regimes) may affect immigrants' placement on the labor-market (for fuller treatment see Kogan, 2006; van Tubergen et al. 2004). Finally, regression models also control for ESS round year.

To explain the Muslim employment gap, logistic regression models predicting employment are estimated. A null model with controls (including ethnic minority status) and Muslim/non-Muslim religious affiliation is followed by subsequent models of variable sets which capture potential individual-level mechanisms underlying employment penalties. In this way, explained variance for the Muslim gap can be determined as each variable set is introduced. Even though Muslims living in Europe have a variety of backgrounds (human capital, migrant background, religiosity, cultural values and perceived discrimination), these factors essentially become equal across Muslims and non-Muslims as each variable group is introduced. A final model with all correlates is also estimated. Also, since many countries have a modal group of Muslims from a particular origin, controlling for the country of residence in the models assists in controlling for differences between different origin groups of Muslims across Europe.[4]

Models are estimated for the complete sample with subsequent analyses for first-generation (foreign-born) Muslims vis-à-vis non-Muslims with no migration background followed by second-generation (at least one foreign-born parent) Muslims again compared with non-Muslims with no migration background. Since the second- generation Muslim population is much younger

[4] Since the sample includes both Muslims and non-Muslims, it is not statistically prudent to include additional controls or use hierarchical modeling for the respondent's origins. Almost the entirety of the non-Muslim population's origins is the same as the respondent's country of residence and thus introduce further collinearity problems.

than the general population, second-generation models are limited to those who are 25 to 44, the age range where about 95% of second-generation Muslims in the ESS fall.

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

4.1. The Muslim employment gap – descriptive findings

We start by presenting descriptive statistics comparing Muslims with non-Muslims in Western Europe. Listing descriptive means for Muslims and non-Muslims, Table 1, shows that, for both men and women, Muslims differ from non-Muslims in almost all variables under consideration.

TABLE 1 VARIABLE MEANS BY RELIGION ABOUT HERE

As expected, there is a significant employment gap between Muslims and non-Muslims.[5] About 94% of non-Muslims in the labor force are employed while the employment rate is only 82% for Muslims.[6] Both population groups also differ in control and explanatory variables, including socio-demographics, socio-economic status, migration background, religiosity and value orientations. Muslims are younger than non-Muslims, more likely to be married and to have children in the home. A lower percentage of Muslims than non-Muslims have some post-secondary education. A smaller proportion of Muslims also had at least one parent working in a professional occupation or employed during childhood. In stark contrast to non-Muslims, most Muslims have a migratory background, with nearly three-fourths being foreign-born, living in

[5] When restricting descriptive statistics to respondents with a migration background (first- and second-generation immigrants), Muslims are still less likely to be employed than non-Muslims.

[6] It should be noted that this number is probably inflated due to sample bias towards more acculturated migrants, or so official statistics of unemployment rates would suggest.

Europe for varying lengths of time. Unsurprisingly, Muslims are much more likely to be a foreign citizen than non-Muslims, and are more likely to speak a foreign language at home.

Muslims are also religiously more active than non-Muslims. They pray more often than non-Muslims and consider religion to be more important in their lives. Even though Muslim women are less likely to attend religious services than Muslim men, the combined average for both sexes indicates that Muslims attend religious services more frequently than non-Muslims. In terms of value orientations, Muslims are less open to change than non-Muslims. Muslims also lean more toward indicators representing self-enhancement and conservation than non-Muslims; however, there are no differences in the self-transcendence value orientation for Muslims and non-Muslims. Finally, as expected, more Muslims are part of an ethnic minority than non-Muslims and perceive themselves to belong to a discriminated group.

While few of these characteristics may come as a surprise, the crucial question remains whether and to what extent they may explain the employment gap of Muslims vis-à-vis non-Muslims. We therefore turn to multivariate regression analyses.

4.2. Individual-level mediators of the Muslim employment gap

Mediating models are estimated in Table 2. In controlling for age, marital status, children in the home and ethnic minority status, the first model indicates that Muslims are nearly 70% less likely to be employed than non-Muslims [exp{-1.123}=0.325]. However, this dramatic

difference in odds is reduced (or the coefficient becomes closer to 0) as each set of mediating variables is introduced.

Model 2 demonstrates that 13% of the Muslim employment gap can be captured by differences in human capital. As seen earlier, Muslims are far less likely to have some post-secondary education than non-Muslims and are also less likely to have had an employed parent or a parent in a professional occupation. All these factors are positive correlates with employment; however, it is striking that human capital does not explain the bulk of the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims.

TABLE 2 LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS PREDICTING EMPLOYMENT– MEDIATING MODELS ABOUT HERE

A higher percentage of variance in the Muslim employment penalty can be explained by migration background. Compared with those with no migration background, immigrants living longer in Europe are more likely to be employed. Including migration timing and generation alongside foreign citizenship and foreign language use explains about a quarter of the variance for the employment gap.

Religiosity (Model 4) and value orientations (Model 5) have much less explanatory power than migration background than is sometimes suggested. While praying and adhering to more

conservative values is associated with a lower probability of employment, these characteristics do not seem to dramatically explain the employment gap between Muslims and non-Muslims. Interestingly, religious service attendance is even positively related to employment.

By contrast, a sizeable portion of the variance is explained in Model 6 where self-perceived discrimination is introduced. About 10% of the Muslim difference in employment from non-Muslims can be explained by experiencing perceived discrimination, which seems to confirm the relevance of boundary dynamics.

When combining all mediating variables in a single model (Model 7), about 40% of the Muslim employment gap is explained. While this is a significant portion of the Muslim employment gap, over half of the difference still remains unaccounted. Although it cannot be ruled out that additional individual-level variables such as social capital (e.g. Kanas and Tubergen 2011) may be relevant, this finding – in combination with the strong power of the individual-level boundary variable – potentially lends support to the argument that Muslims face particular barriers when entering the labor market.

4.3. The Muslim employment gap among first- and second-generation immigrants

To further explore this argument, we separate out models for both immigrant generations; after all, access to employment may depend on specific characteristics for each generation. Table 3 examines the situation of *first-generation* (or foreign-born) Muslims compared with non-Muslims with no migration background. The amount of explained variance for Muslim

employment penalties for each mediating variable group is quite similar to the experience of all Muslims presented in the preceding table.[7] Human capital variables explain about 12% of the Muslim first-generation employment penalty. A smaller proportion of the Muslim/non-Muslim difference is explained by migration background variables such as foreign citizenship and foreign language use. Religiosity and value orientation variables explain hardly any of the variance. Lastly, an important source of employment differences between Muslims and non-Muslims is related to perceived discrimination, which explains about 10% of the Muslim/non-Muslim employment difference. Different from the full sample of Muslims, only about 15% of the Muslim penalty can be jointly explained by a combination of all variables included in these models.

TABLE 3 LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS PREDICTING EMPLOYMENT FOR FIRST-GENERATION MUSLIMS

ABOUT HERE

Table 4 presents the same set of models, but for the Muslim *second generation* for whom entry to the labor market is a particularly crucial test of potential barriers to integration, having received similar education as the majority peers. (The number of Muslim second-generation cases is small at 185. This limitation in the data is important to remember as each model is presented, since the fact that the Muslim coefficient becoming less significant once mediating variables are introduced may be a mere result of sample size. Also, findings with this small

[7] Interestingly, analyses not displayed here show that the magnitude of effects and percent variance explained by mediating variables remains similar when Muslim first-generation immigrants are compared to the non-Muslim first-generation immigrant population; this lends further support to the argument that Muslims do indeed face particular ethno-religious penalties.

number of cases spread across multiple countries with multiple time points should be treated with caution.)

Similar to first-generation Muslims, second-generation Muslims are nearly 60% less likely to be employed [exp{--0.928}=0.395] than non-Muslims aged 25 to 44 years.[8] When human capital variables (education, parental SES) are included in Model 2, the Muslim penalty among the second generation is still significant and explains about a fifth of the variance.

TABLE 4 LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS PREDICTING EMPLOYMENT FOR SECOND-GENERATION MUSLIMS ABOUT HERE

As with first-generation Muslims, religiosity and value orientations for second-generation Muslims hold much less explanatory power, barely altering the negative Muslim coefficient (see Model 3). However, variables capturing self-perceived discrimination do appear to diminish the employment penalty for the Muslim second generation, with about 28% of the variance explained by sensing group discrimination. In mathematical terms, perceived discrimination represents the highest level of explained variance compared with other variables, even more so than previous models of first-generation Muslims and all Muslims combined. All told, and similar to previous models, nearly half (46%) of differences in second-generation Muslim employment can be explained by these individual-level factors.

[8] Again, findings are similar when comparing second-generation Muslims to the non-Muslim second-generation.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Western Europe has often been described as an immigration context with salient religious boundaries against Islam that potentially make religious minority affiliation a "barrier" to socio-economic integration (Alba, 2005, Foner and Alba 2008; Zolberg and Woon, 1999). Although employment penalties for Muslims on the labor market have often been cited as evidence for such barriers, few studies have tested the argument about "barriers" against potential individual-level variables that might mediate employment gaps between Muslims and non-Muslims. Only such analysis, however, provides a starting point for determining whether employment gaps are due to individual-level background characteristics or whether they indicate that symbolic boundaries translate into processes of social closure, or some combination of both.

This paper has made an attempt to contribute to these research questions, by analyzing pooled ESS data on employment across Western European countries. In sum, our multivariate analyses confirm previous findings that human capital and migration background variables partly explain disadvantages of Muslims on the labor market. Muslim religiosity and value orientations, however, which sometimes are cited as major individual-level factors hindering socio-economic assimilation turned out to be less consequential. Individual perceptions of discrimination, by contrast, were the variables with strongest mediating effects. But even taken together, all these individual-level variables explained only about half of the Muslim employment penalty for the full sample. To be sure, there could be other individual-level variables which might mediate the Muslim employment penalty. However, our findings suggest at least the possibility that Muslims suffer from particular disadvantages and potential discrimination as highlighted by Adida et al.

(2010) in the French context. This finding is even more relevant as separate analyses for first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants display rather similar results.

Evidently, our analyses face a number of limitations. First of all, the ESS data presumably represents a more acculturated group of Muslim immigrants and their adult children, thus biasing results. However, this actually provides for a conservative test of Muslim employment gaps that, if anything, underestimates the Muslim penalty on European labor markets. Second, we cannot rule out that other individual-level variables such as social capital might increase the explained variance of Muslim/non-Muslim differences on the labor market. Lastly, Muslim employment gaps and their correlates may vary across European countries as suggested by previous analysis of immigrants' employment (e.g. Kogan 2006; van Tubergen et al. 2004). While our use of fixed effects controlled for such unobserved heterogeneity, it would be desirable to analyze country-specific effects in greater detail.[9] But these limitations notwithstanding, the paper warrants further theory-building on how religious difference affects individual dispositions as well as opportunities for labor market performance (see also Heath and Martin 2013: 1026). And it certainly warrants more survey-based, experimental and qualitative research on the precise mechanisms through which symbolic boundaries articulated in institutional frameworks or public discourse turn into tangible social boundaries affecting individuals' socio-economic success.

[9] As a robustness test, employment differences between Muslims and non-Muslims mediated by a similar grouping of human capital, immigration and religiosity variables were tested with national surveys from Germany (2005 Gender and Generations Survey), France (2008 Trajectoires et Origines Survey) and the United Kingdom (2009 UK Understanding Society Survey). Significant employment differences between Muslims and non-Muslims remained in all three countries after individual-level differences were taken into account.

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Table 1. Variable Means by Religion			
	Non-Muslim	Muslim	
Employed	0.94	0.82	*
Female	0.46	0.30	*
Age	43	39	*
Married	0.63	0.71	*
Child(ren) in the home	0.55	0.65	*
Some Post Secondary Education	0.39	0.26	*
Parent(s) Professional Occupation	0.34	0.18	*
Parent(s) Employed	0.97	0.89	*
No Migration Background (ref.)	0.84	0.04	*
In Country <1 year	0.00	0.01	
In Country 1 to 5 years	0.01	0.10	*
In Country 6 to 10 years	0.01	0.15	*
In Country 11 to 20 years	0.02	0.18	*
In Country More Than 20 years	0.04	0.31	*
Second Generation	0.07	0.22	*
Foreign Citizenship	0.04	0.42	*
Speaks Foreign Language at Home	0.05	0.53	*
Prays Daily or More	0.12	0.48	*
Attends Religious Services Monthly or More	0.17	0.41	*
Importance of Religion (1 to 10 scale, 10 highest)	4.26	6.72	*
Values - Opennes to Change (1 to 6 scale)	4.13	4.09	*
Values - Self-enhancement (1 to 6 scale)	3.52	3.84	*
Values - Conservation (1 to 6 scale)	4.18	4.69	*
Values - Self-transcendence (1 to 6 scale)	4.91	4.98	*
Self-idenitifed Ethnic Minority	0.04	0.55	*
Self-perceived Discrimination	0.07	0.33	*
N	76,185	1,142	
* p<0.05, means are weighted using a combination of ESS design and population weights			
Sample limited to those in the labor force aged 25 to 64.			

Table 2. Logistic Regression Coefficients Predicting Employment - Mediating Models

	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7
Muslim (ref: non-Muslim)	-1.123 (0.093) ***	-0.978 (0.094) ***	-0.891 (0.096) ***	-1.117 (0.094) ***	-1.102 (0.093) ***	-1.013 (0.094) ***	-0.677 (0.099) ***
Some Post Secondary Education		0.683 (0.683) ***					0.678 (0.037) ***
Parent(s) Professional Occupation		0.093 (0.036) *					0.107 (0.036) **
Parent(s) Employed		0.439 (0.070) ***					0.408 (0.069) ***
No Migration Background	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
In Country <1 year			-1.476 (0.245) ***				-1.690 (0.248) ***
In Country 1 to 5 years			-0.591 (0.122) ***				-0.610 (0.125) ***
In Country 6 to 10 years			-0.653 (0.110) ***				-0.653 (0.111) ***
In Country 11 to 20 years			-0.496 (0.095) ***				-0.479 (0.096) ***
In Country More Than 20 years			-0.283 (0.077) ***				-0.305 (0.078) ***
Second Generation			-0.141 (0.065) *				-0.120 (0.066)
Foreign Citizenship			0.019 (0.087)				0.081 (0.088)
Speaks Foreign Language at Home			-0.059 (0.069)				-0.049 (0.069)
Prays Daily or More				-0.164 (0.046) ***			-0.115 (0.046) *
Attends Religious Services Monthly or More				0.200 (0.045) ***			0.220 (0.045) ***
Importance of Religion (1 to 10 scale, 10 highest)				0.002 (0.003)			0.003 (0.003)
Values - Opennes to Change (1 to 6 scale)					-0.014 (0.024)		-0.011 (0.024)
Values - Self-enhancement (1 to 6 scale)					0.118 (0.020) ***		0.087 (0.020) ***
Values - Conservation (1 to 6 scale)					-0.110 (0.023) ***		-0.046 (0.024)
Values - Self-transcendence (1 to 6 scale)					0.061 (0.028) *		0.006 (0.028)
Self-perceived Discrimination						-0.681 (0.051) ***	-0.657 0.0522) ***
Constant	2.891 (0.126) ***	2.213 (0.142) ***	2.998 (0.127) ***	2.868 (0.127) ***	2.543 (0.183) ***	2.961 (0.127) ***	2.191 (0.194) ***
Muslim/Non-Muslim Difference Explained Variance		13%	21%	1%	2%	10%	40%

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, * p<0.05

Sample limited to those in the labor force aged 25 to 64.

Models also control for sex, country of residence, year of survey, age, marital status, child(ren) in the home and self-identified ethnic minority status

Standard errors in parentheses

Total N = 77,327 (Muslim N=1,142; Non-Muslim N=76,185)

Table 3. Logistic Regression Coefficients Predicting Employment - First-Generation Muslims

	m1			m2			m3			m4			m5			m6			m7		
Muslim (ref: non-Muslim)	-1.376	(0.117)	***	-1.216	(0.118)	***	-1.332	(0.166)	***	-1.407	(0.118)	***	-1.384	(0.117)	***	-1.240	(0.118)	***	-1.174	(0.170)	***
Some Post Secondary Education				0.749	(0.042)	***													0.745	(0.042)	***
Parent(s) Professional Occupation				0.118	(0.041)	**													0.126	(0.041)	**
Parent(s) Employed				0.468	(0.078)	***													0.453	(0.079)	***
Foreign Citizenship							-0.172	(0.180)											-0.029	(0.185)	
Speaks Foreign Language at Home							0.102	(0.112)											0.112	(0.113)	
Prays Daily or More										-0.112	(0.053)	*							-0.092	(0.054)	
Attends Religious Services Monthly or More										0.221	(0.051)	***							0.223	(0.052)	***
Importance of Religion (1 to 10 scale, 10 highest)										0.007	(0.004)								0.007	(0.004)	
Values - Opennes to Change (1 to 6 scale)													-0.020	(0.027)					-0.007	(0.027)	
Values - Self-enhancement (1 to 6 scale)													0.123	(0.022)	***				0.078	(0.023)	**
Values - Conservation (1 to 6 scale)													-0.072	(0.026)	**				-0.013	(0.027)	
Values - Self-transcendence (1 to 6 scale)													0.074	(0.031)	*				0.005	(0.032)	
Self-perceived Discrimination																-0.788	(0.060)	***	-0.819	(0.061)	***
Constant	2.915	(0.141)	***	2.178	(0.159)	***	2.916	(0.141)	***	2.881	(0.142)	***	2.381	(0.204)	***	2.987	(0.141)	***	1.942	(0.216)	***
Muslim/Non-Muslim Difference Explained Variance				12%			3%			-2%			-1%			10%			15%		

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, * p<0.05

Sample limited to those in the labor force aged 25 to 64.

Models also control for sex, country of residence, year of survey, age, marital status, child(ren) in the home and self-identified ethnic minority status

Standard errors in parentheses

Total N = 65,250 (Muslim N=884; Non-Muslim N=64,366)

Table 4. Logistic Regression Coefficients Predicting Employment - Second-Generation Muslims																				
	m1			m2			m3			m4			m5			m6				
Muslim (ref: non-Muslim)	-0.928	(0.238)	***	-0.734	(0.239)	**	-0.960	(0.240)	***	-0.917	(0.239)	***	-0.667	(0.242)	**	-0.498	(0.245)	*		
Some Post Secondary Education				0.727	(0.052)	***										0.729	(0.053)	***		
Parent(s) Professional Occupation				0.168	(0.052)	**										0.174	(0.052)	**		
Parent(s) Employed				0.693	(0.097)	***										0.672	(0.098)	***		
Prays Daily or More							-0.070	(0.069)								-0.043	(0.075)			
Attends Religious Services Monthly or More							0.195	(0.005)	**							0.197	(0.070)	**		
Importance of Religion (1 to 10 scale, 10 highest)							0.002	(0.045)								0.002	(0.005)			
Values - Opennes to Change (1 to 6 scale)										0.022	(0.035)					0.046	(0.035)			
Values - Self-enhancement (1 to 6 scale)										0.138	(0.029)	***				0.089	(0.029)	**		
Values - Conservation (1 to 6 scale)										-0.040	(0.033)					0.011	(0.035)			
Values - Self-transcendence (1 to 6 scale)										0.012	(0.040)					-0.058	(0.041)			
Self-perceived Discrimination													-0.825	(0.077)	***	-0.850	(0.078)	***		
Constant	2.449	(0.197)	***	1.552	(0.217)	***	2.427	(0.198)	***	1.798	(0.278)	***	2.464	(0.197)	***	1.159	(0.292)	***		
Muslim/Non-Muslim Difference Explained Variance				21%			-3%			1%			28%			46%				
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, * p<0.05																				
Sample limited to those in the labor force aged 25 to 44.																				
Models also control for sex, country of residence, year of survey, age, marital status, child(ren) in the home and self-identified ethnic minority status																				
Standard errors in parentheses																				
Total N = 36,401 (Muslim N=185; Non-Muslim N=36,216)																				