Long-Term Effects of Gender Role Attitudes on the Transition to Parenthood: Do Egalitarian Men Catch Up?

Eva Bernhardt and Jani Turunen
Stockholm University

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ABSTRACT

Swedish men with more traditional gender attitudes have been found to become parents at an earlier age than men with egalitarian attitudes, while women's gender attitudes had no effect on women's transition to parenthood. However, the respondents were quite young and the effect could have changed over time, resulting in a 'catching-up' effect for egalitarian men.

In this paper we investigate this possibility by extending the observation period from four to fourteen years, and including partner status as a time-varying covariate. We find little evidence that egalitarian men catch up with more traditional men when it comes to the transition to parenthood (or later transitions). As to partnering behavior, it seems that egalitarian men are more exposed to partnered life, thereby reducing the difference between them and men with more traditional attitudes with regard to the effect of gender attitudes on first births. But they do not seem to catch up. We suggest that one possible explanation for this is that more traditional men are likely to partner with more traditional women who have been shown to be more enthusiastic about the benefits of children than women with gender-equal attitudes.

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INTRODUCTION

Sweden has maintained cohort fertility levels close to replacement (Frejka 2008) despite its 'modern' family patterns, such as unmarried cohabitation, delayed parenthood, and high breakup rates, which are usually linked with low birth rates and high levels of childlessness. Most Swedish young adults expect to become parents (Kaufman and Bernhardt 2012), and Sweden has among the highest TFRs in Europe (1.91); the average for the 28 countries in the European Union is 1.58 (Eurostat 2012). Although final childlessness was increasing slightly in Sweden for the birth cohorts from 1945 to 1960, there is now a declining trend (Persson 2010). These figures are of course for women, as childlessness for men is rarely calculated.

Many analysts attribute the relatively high fertility in Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries to the substantial state support provided to families, which greatly reduces the costs of child raising (McDonald 2000, Hoem 2005, Oláh and Bernhardt 2008). The fact that Sweden is a highly egalitarian country, in contrast, is usually not considered to be a factor in its relatively high fertility, as egalitarian gender roles are normally associated with lower, not higher, fertility. Studies of the effects of gender roles on fertility, however, have focused almost entirely on women. Egalitarian women must normally trade off time and energy between caring for family and participating in employment. This is less likely to be a problem for men, as although they are expected to work full time (even in Sweden), their increased contributions to childcare might be pronatalist, by increasing their family orientation and reducing the pressure on employed women to curtail their fertility. To date, however, the question of the relationship between egalitarian gender role attitudes and fertility for men has primarily been examined at the macro level, with

conflicting results (e.g., Westoff and Higgins 2009; Goldscheider, Oláh, Puur 2010). Few studies exist at the micro-level.

In this paper we will investigate the long-term effects of gender role attitudes on men's transition to parenthood and continued family building. We use Swedish panel survey data on gender role attitudes among still childless young adults aged 22-30 in 1999, combined with register data on births in the period 1999-2012. The results will give us a better handle on the very essential question of whether men's increasing involvement with their homes and children, the second half of the gender revolution (Goldscheider 2012), will contribute to strengthening the family, contrary to what is generally assumed in the theory of the Second Demographic Transition or SDT (Lesthaeghe 2010).

BACKGROUND

Our analysis rests on three quite distinct literatures. These are 1) on gender roles and fertility, 2) on the role of men in the gender revolution, and 3) on studies of the postponement of childbearing and whether delayed fertility is made up, or recuperated. Our central question is: Do more egalitarian men, who are likely to become parents at later ages than less egalitarian men, eventually catch up?

Gender Roles and Fertility

One of the strongest findings in the literature on gender roles and fertility is that when women hold attitudes that reinforce roles for themselves that go beyond home and family to include more public activities such as paid employment, they have fewer children and have them later in their lives *(e.g.,* Kaufman 2000). Many studies have shown that educational enrollment and attainment generally have a negative effect on fertility, leading to a higher age at first birth and more childlessness among women (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991, Dribe and Stanfors 2009,

Mills et al. 2011). Labor force participation is also related to lower fertility and delayed childbearing (Bernhardt 1993, Andersson 2000). These new roles for women in the public sphere require more preparation than does a life focused on childrearing, thus increasing the age of motherhood. Such roles can also raise the costs of children in many ways, from the need for child care to the alternative cost of women's time, and reduce the benefits of children by making motherhood a less central element of women's adult roles (Lesthaeghe 1983). Hence, this aspect of the gender revolution has contributed to lower fertility (Goldscheider 2012).

But what about the relationship between gender roles and fertility for men? Do less traditional gender roles make marriage and parenthood less central in men's lives as in women's? Would holding more egalitarian attitudes increase the cost of parenthood for men as well, because they must invest more time and energy in children, making them also less willing to have children for this reason? Such questions look very different from the perspective of men, as women's taking on more of the support burden in young families might make more egalitarian men feel less pressure to establish a well-paying career before becoming a father, reducing their costs of children. Egalitarian men's greater investment in their homes and families might in fact make family even *more* central in the lives and identities of men than among more traditional, i.e., career-focused, men.

Further, as men see other men sharing actively in the care of children (Kaufman 2013, Sullivan et al. 2014, McGill 2014), they may develop a greater appreciation of the benefits of becoming fathers. If so, then more egalitarian men might be more rather than less likely to want to become fathers than men with more traditional gender role attitudes, which would increase fertility. In this case, the maturing of the gender revolution may contribute to an increase in fertility or at least offset its decline. To evaluate this possibility, it is necessary to understand more about men's orientation towards fatherhood.

Existing studies have shown mixed results. Miettinen et al (2011) found a U-shaped association among men in Finland, and concluded that both traditional and egalitarian attitudes seemed to raise men's expected fertility. A Swedish study of actual childbearing, including men as well as women, found that men with traditional attitudes became fathers at an earlier age than those with more egalitarian attitudes, while women's gender role attitudes, contrary to conventional wisdom, had no effect on women's transition to parenthood (Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2006). These last results reinforce the view that egalitarian gender role attitudes reduce fertility, or at least delay the entry to fatherhood. However, as the respondents were still quite young and the effect could change over time, it is possible that men with egalitarian attitudes actually 'catch up' and become fathers more or less to the same extent as men with more traditional attitudes.

Men in the gender revolution

Our starting point is the theory of the two parts of the gender revolution, which focuses on the structural changes in gender relationships that have occurred over the past half-century or so (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2014b). The first half of the gender revolution, the dramatic rise in labor force participation of women (even those with small children), was associated with increasing stress in family relationships, resulting in decreasing fertility and higher breakup rates. These trends, normally linked with the SDT (e.g., Lesthaeghe 2010), might be reversed, however, as the gender revolution moves into its second half, the increasing involvement of men in the family (Goldscheider, Bernhardt and Lappegård 2014a).

In the first half of the gender revolution, women joined men in the public sphere of education, work and employment. There is increasing evidence that men are now beginning to join women in the private sphere of the family, not just by providing economic support, together with their female partners, but also by taking an active part in home tasks and childcare (Sullivan

et al. 2014, Aassve et al. 2014). Whether this will strengthen the family, by increasing fertility and decreasing family dissolution risks, is still a disputed issue, although there are some recent studies that provide support for such an effect (Kaufman 2000, Torr and Short 2004, Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Brandén 2013 for fertility; Olah and Gähler, 2012 and Sigle-Rushton 2010 for separation).

The theoretical framework of the gender revolution makes us prioritize men's active involvement in home tasks and childcare as the relevant dimension to capture 'gender equality'. We hypothesize that it is 'domestic gender equality' that matters for fertility. For childless men and women (with or without a partner) it is expectations about an egalitarian sharing of home tasks that are likely to influence the transition to parenthood.

The postponement of childbearing and recuperation

The postponement of childbearing has been a pervasive trend in developed countries over the past several decades, and it is a key component in the concept of the SDT (Lesthaeghe 2010). The growth in gender equality is frequently identified as one of the major driving forces behind the postponement of family formation (e.g., Billari et al. 2006, Mills et al. 2011), as a part of the ideational changes that have led to the emergence of 'postmodern fertility preferences' (van de Kaa 2001). Clearly demographic events leading to the formation of new households and families now occur later in the lives of young adults, men as well as women. The extent to which delayed births are recuperated at later ages, however, remains an open question. Frejka and Sobotka (2008) found that recuperation is indeed taking place, at least for women, especially regarding first births, but that the extent of recuperation differs by country and region. They also found higher rates of recuperation in Northern and Western Europe than elsewhere. To the best of our knowledge, there is so far no study of recuperation among men.

Why Sweden?

According to *The Global Gender Gap Report* for 2013 (World Economic Forum 2013), Sweden is one of the most gender-equal societies in the world. The Gender Gap Index is designed to measure gender-based gaps in access to resources and opportunities, and therefore benchmarks national gender gaps on economic, political, education- and health-based criteria. Consequently, it deals with gender equality in the public sphere. There is also substantial evidence that gender equality characterizes the private sphere of the family in Sweden (Mencarini and Sironi 2012, Olah and Bernhardt 2008, Evertsson 2014). Thus it is not surprising that this study shows that a substantial majority of young adults express egalitarian attitudes, in the sense that they expect to share the responsibility for home and children equally with their partner (80% of young women, 74% of young men).

Table 1 about here

Given these very high levels of egalitarian attitudes and behaviors, both in the public sphere of work and education, and in the private sphere of the home, Sweden is an ideal location to examine the question of how men's gender role attitudes affect their fertility, both in terms of the timing of their entry to fatherhood and their likelihood of catching up. At a minimum, it will clarify whether this high level of gender equality is holding back Sweden's fertility level, or even reinforcing the effects of family policies on strengthening the family.

DATA AND METHOD

Data and Measures

We analyze Swedish survey data on gender egalitarian attitudes toward parenthood among young adults aged 22-30 in 1999 combined with register information on childbearing

from 1999 to 2012.The survey "Young Adult Panel Study (YAPS)" was carried out by Statistics Sweden. Based on a nationally representative sample, 3,408 individuals born in 1968, 1972, and 1976 were asked to respond to a mail questionnaire that included questions about their plans, expectations and attitudes regarding family and working life. Factual information about their current situation and background characteristics was also included. The response rate was 67 per cent: 2,273 respondents returned their questionnaires.

To assess the relationship between gender egalitarian attitudes and childbearing, we matched the respondents with data from administrative registers, giving us information on childbearing from the survey to 2012. The register data captures respondents' major life transitions, including marriage, childbirth, divorce and death. It does however not capture transitions in and out of unmarried cohabiting relationships for couples without shared children. To assess any influence of the respondents' partnership status on the outcome variable we also use data from the third wave of the YAPS survey carried out in 2009. In this wave the respondents provided union histories with start and end month for each of their co-residential unions.

Variables

The outcome variable for our main analysis (effects of attitudes on becoming a parent) is a dichotomous variable, measuring whether or not the respondent had a first birth in the 14-year period between the time of the survey in 1999 and the end of 2012, or in the period between 1999 and 2009 for our additional analysis. The outcome variable is based on year and month of birth of the first registered biological child of the respondent. Based on information from the administrative registers we also constructed a dichotomous variable for childlessness at the time

of the survey for the analysis assessing any relationship between gender egalitarian attitudes and belonging to our main risk pool of childless men and women in 1999.

Our main explanatory variable is gender role attitudes. Gender role attitudes were measured by using the answers to the question: "What do you think would be the best arrangement for a family with small children?" with the following response alternatives:

1) Only the man works and the woman takes the main responsibility for home and children
2) Both parents work, but the woman works part-time and takes the main responsibility for home and children
3) Both work, but the man works part-time and takes the main responsibility for home and children
4) Both work roughly the same hours and share the responsibility for home and children equally

We combine the third and fourth alternatives and label it "egalitarian," and the first two, indicating a "traditional" gender role attitude towards work-family balance.

In the analysis we also control for age in 1999 (22, 26, 30), partnership status (single or partnered), educational level (basic, upper secondary, lower post-secondary, and upper post-secondary), metropolitan residence (whether or not the respondent lives in one of the three largest cities in Sweden: Stockholm, Gothenburg, or Malmö), a variable indicating whether the respondent was employed in 1999 (at the time of the first survey), and, finally, whether the respondent had a parent born outside Sweden. Many of these variables have been found to have significant effects on measures of the costs and benefits of parenthood either for men or for women (Kaufman 1997; Seccombe 1991). All the variables used in the main analysis are measured at the time of the 1999 survey, and their distributions are presented in Table 1. For the

additional analysis of the period 1999-2009 we include a time varying covariate for partnership status (with the categories single, cohabiting and married).

Methods

We analyzed how gender egalitarian attitudes structure the likelihood of having a first birth. For this analysis, we used Cox proportional hazard regression. The outcome variable was whether or not the respondent had a first birth during the period starting at the month of survey in 1999 and ending at the end of year 2012. To test for the selectivity of continuing to be childless, in each analysis we examine relationships separately for each cohort (age 22, 26, and 30 in 1999). The analysis was also done separately for men and women. To assess whether any association between gender egalitarian attitudes and having a first child is mediated by the respondent's union status we conducted additional hazard regression analyses with a shorter follow up time (10 years) during which we have time-varying information on partnership.

In order to deal with the problem of left censoring, i.e. the respondent already having had a first child at the beginning of our analysis period, we ran logistic regressions of the likelihood of childlessness in 1999, at the time of the first survey.

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Results

By ages 22-30, many of young adults in this sample will already have made the transition to parenthood, especially among women, as men tend to start their family formation at later ages than women. In order to deal with the problem of left censoring we have run logistic regression of the likelihood of childlessness in 1999, at the time of the first survey (Table 2), using only those measures unlikely to be affected by the transition to parenthood.

Table 2 about here

Women are clearly much less likely than men to be childless at the start of our observation period (1999-2012), which is also the case for older respondents. Post-secondary education and metropolitan residence are associated with higher likelihoods of childlessness, and thus a higher likelihood of being included in our analytic sample of 2138 young adults (1105 men and 1033 women), whereas young adults of immigrant background are much less likely to be childless.

In order to detect any sign of catching up by men with more gender-equal attitudes, we ran Cox regressions of the transition to parenthood by December 2003, 2007, and 2012 for the total and by sex. However, the hazard ratios for first birth are almost identical for those three points in time. Those with traditional gender attitudes are about 20 percent more likely to have made the transition to parenthood, with no significant differences between men and women.

Clearly, this analysis does not give any support for the hypothesis that more egalitarian men will catch up.

Table 3 about here

Women continue to be more likely than men to have a first birth within this time span, while having a co-residential partner in 1999 makes it twice as likely that these young adults will make the transition to parenthood, compared to those still unpartnered. Moreover, post-secondary education and being employed (in 1999) both have strong positive effects, while still being childless at age 30 decreases the likelihood of a first birth in the following 14 years, with little difference between those who were childless age age 22 or 26 at the original interview. In contrast, metropolitan residence now loses its importance for the transition to parenthood – clearly, very early childbearing is not compatible with life styles of young people in metropolitan areas, but once they reach 'prime childbearing years' of the life course, their family formation behavior does not seem to differ from those in other parts of the country. They, at least, catch up.

However, there is an intricate interplay between age and cohort in this data set. Our observation period goes from the 1999 survey to the end of 2012. As the 1999 survey was conducted in the spring, this means a time span of almost 14 years. The respondents belong to three different birth cohorts, 1968, 1972, and 1976, which means that at the start of 1999 they were 30, 26, or 22 years old, respectively. The observation period therefore covers the ages 30 to 44 for the oldest cohort, 26 to 40 for the middle one, and 22 to 36 for the youngest one.

Table 4 about here

Running Cox regression for the three birth cohorts separately, we find that the positive effect on first births of holding a more traditional gender attitude is restricted to those who were 26 years old in 1999, i.e. the middle of our three birth cohorts. While not significant for women,

men with traditional attitudes in 1999 were almost 50 percent more likely to have had first birth before the end of 2012, compared to those with more egalitarian attitudes. Having a co-residential partner in 1999 has more or less the same effect for the three birth cohorts, while the positive effect for women increases with age. Thus, 30-year old women are 64 percent more likely than same age men to make the transition to parenthood before age 44, while those aged 22 in 1999 are only 26 percent more likely than men. But men can continue to have children beyond age 44, when almost all women have reached the end of their reproductive period. However, age-specific fertility rates for men and women, provided by Statistics Sweden, show that while women have fertility rates close to zero after age 45, even the men have rates lower than 15 per 1000 in the age span 45 to 50, and rates which approach zero up to age 55. Thus, very few men in the oldest cohort will become fathers after the end of our observation period. However, those in the youngest cohort, who were only 36 years old at the end of the observation period, still have some more potential childbearing years.

One possible explanation for the finding that men with more traditional gender attitudes seem to maintain their higher likelihood of becoming fathers compared to men with more egalitarian attitudes (i.e. no signs of a catching-up effect for the egalitarian men) could be differences in partnering behavior. In addition to partnering earlier, they may also stay partnered to a larger extent, and therefore be more exposed to partnered life. To control for differences in partnering behavior, we have repeated the Cox regression analysis for a smaller sample, including a time-varying variable with three categories: unpartnered, cohabiting and married. The sample is smaller because the analytic sample can only include the 850 respondents who participated in both 1999 and 2009 survey (and were childless in 1999).

Table 5 about here

The results in Table 5 show that being unpartnered sharply reduces the likelihood of making the transition to parenthood for both men and women. However, traditional gender attitudes among men still have a positive effect on childbearing. It increases the hazard ratio to 1.40, compared to 1.20 in the earlier analysis. This implies that contrary to our earlier assumption that egalitarian men are less exposed to partnered life, they seem to partner (and/or stay partnered) to a greater extent than men with more traditional gender attitudes. So it seems that their partnering behavior reduces the difference between them and men with more traditional attitudes when it comes to the effect of gender attitudes on first births. But they do not catch up.

Thus, although we find little evidence that egalitarian men catch up when it comes to the transition to parenthood, it could be that once they have become parents they might be more likely to go on and have a second (and a third?) child. To get some indication of such a partial catching-up, we have calculated provisional parity progression ratios on the basis of their parity distributions in 2012.

Table 6.

Parity in 2012	Men		Women	
	non-trad	trad	non-trad	trad
At least one	61,6	68,9	74,3	76,2
At least two if at least one	70,9	74,4	76,0	72,8
At least three if at least two	18,8	22,1	21,6	17,6

The figures in Table 6 do not provide any evidence that egalitarian men 'catch up' once they become parents, although the difference between non-traditional and traditional men seems to narrow by about half. In contrast, women with egalitarian attitudes show signs of catching up compared to women with more traditional attitudes, as higher percentages of egalitarian women

go on to have a second birth, once they have become mothers, or to have a third birth once they have had a second birth.

Discussion

In this paper, we examined the effect of men's holding relatively egalitarian gender role attitudes on their transition to parenthood. We extended an earlier analysis that followed men for four years by an additional 14 years, in order to determine if the negative effect of holding such attitudes on the transition to parenthood that appeared in the earlier analysis was attenuated, erased, or even reversed at later ages. However, we found little evidence that egalitarian men will catch up with more traditional men when it comes to the transition to parenthood (or later transitions); more traditional men's early advantage was maintained throughout the remainder of the period.

We examined whether this result could be the outcome of different partnering patterns, if more egalitarian men were less exposed to the risk of fatherhood by being less likely to partner or remain partnered, and found, in fact, that differences in partnering behavior were actually suppressing differential parenthood behavior between men with more and less egalitarian attitudes, because men with more egalitarian attitudes were more likely to partner and to remain partnered. Hence, presumably the children that more egalitarian men do have would be better off, in that they grow up in more stable families. Nevertheless, more egalitarian men were less likely to make the transition to fatherhood well into their life course, although a few men had the chance the 'catch up', as part of the sample had only reached age 36.

What could explain this finding? One possible explanation could be that more traditional men are inclined to partner with more traditional women. In an earlier paper on the transition to

parenthood in Sweden (Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2006), it was found that women with more traditional gender attitudes were significantly more likely to expect greater benefits of parenthood, which in turn had a strongly positive effect on becoming a parent. So our analysis suggests that partnering behavior, in the sense of partner choice, might be an important explanation for the advantage that more traditional men continue to hold over those with more egalitarian attitudes, both when it comes to first and later births.

Given the newness of these new gender role patterns, even in Sweden, it is likely that negotiating shared parenting produces high costs in time and confusion, making delay a likely outcome of gender equality, at least until it becomes more fully institutionalized. A further reason our hypothesis was not supported might be that these male respondents' gender role attitudes do not always translate into more egalitarian behavior. In a related paper (Goldscheider, et al. 2013), Swedish women who had egalitarian attitudes (and hence were likely to be attracted to similar men) were found to have lower fertility if their relationships turned out not to be characterized by sharing housework than if they had held traditional attitudes. Although this only applied to the transition to second births, this suggests that the current analysis is handicapped by not having information either on the partner's attitudes or on actual sharing behavior. Nevertheless, these results indicate that at least for now, men's holding egalitarian attitudes is anti-natalist, at least in a country that while it is well advanced in the second half of the gender revolution, still has a long way to go.

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	All respondents		Men		Women	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Gender attitudes in 1999						
Traditional	437	20	274	25	163	16
Egalitarian	1701	80	831	75	870	84
Gender						
Man	1105	52	-	-	-	-
Woman	1033	48	-	-	-	-
Educational in 1999						
Basic	173	8	96	9	77	7
Upper secondary	1298	61	683	62	615	60
Lowe post-secondary	531	25	274	25	257	25
Upper post-secondary	136	6	52	5	84	8
Age in 1999						
22	1032	48	495	45	537	52
26	727	34	377	34	350	34
30	379	18	233	21	146	14
Metropolitan residence in 1999						
Non-metropolitan	1198	56	659	60	539	52
Metropolitan	940	44	446	40	498	48
Partner status in 1999						
Unpartnered	1194	56	662	60	532	52
Partnered	909	42	420	38	489	47
Unknown	35	2	23	2	12	1
Employed in 1999						
Employed	1388	65	748	68	640	62
Unemployed	750	35	357	32	393	38
Immigrant background						
Non-immigrant	1693	79	896	81	797	77
Immigrant background	445	21	209	19	236	23

Table 2. Likelihood of childlessness at month of survey (Logistic regression)

	All	Men	Women
Sex			
Men (ref.)			
Women	.30***	-	-
Education in 1999			
Basic	.39***	.67	.27***
Upper secondary (ref.)			
Lower post-secondary	2.42***	2.35**	2.53***
Upper post-secondary	2.23***	1.72*	2.47***
Age in 1999			
22 (ref.)			
26	.15***	.10***	.17***
30	.04***	.03***	.04***
Metropolitan residence in 1999			
No (ref).			
Yes	1.89***	1.63*	2.07***
Immigrant background			
Swedish (ref.)			
Polish or Turkish	0.66**	.46**	.80
Constant	33.81**	51.17***	9.06***
N	2798	1307	1491

Table 3. Cox regression: Hazard ratio for first birth (by December 2012, 2007 & 2003) total and by sex

	First child by December 2012			First child by December 2007			First child by December 2003		
	All	**Men**	**Women**	**All**	**Men**	**Women**	**All**	**Men**	**Women**
Gender attitudes 1999									
Gender equal attitudes (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Traditional attitudes	1.20**	1.22*	1.16	1.20**	1.21*	1.18(*)	1.20**	1.22*	1.18(*)
Sex									
Men (ref.)	1.00	-	-	1.00	-	-	1.00	-	-
Women	1.30***	-	-	1.28***	-	-	1.21***	-	-
Education in 1999									
Basic	0.81*	1.01	0.66**	0.85	1.04	0.70*	0.89	1.02	0.78
Upper secondary (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Lower post-secondary	1.13(*)	1.23*	1.06	1.10	1.19(*)	1.05	1.06	1.12	1.02
Upper post-secondary	1.49***	1.65**	1.31(*)	1.42**	1.57*	1.25	1.33*	1.48*	1.18
Age in 1999									
22 (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
26	1.08	0.99	1.16(*)	1.11(*)	1.04	1.18*	1.09	1.03	1.14
30	0.64***	0.51***	0.83	0.68***	0.55***	0.88	0.80**	0.67***	1.01
Metropolitan residence 1999									
No (ref).	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Yes	1.03	1.12	0.96	1.03	1.08	0.98	1.01	1.10	0.93
Partnership status, 1999									
Unpartnered	0.46***	0.47***	0.45***	0.47***	0.47***	0.46***	0.53***	0.53***	0.52***
Partnered (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Unknown	0.55**	0.51*	0.57	0.62*	0.59(*)	0.62	0.79	0.82	0.70
Employed 1999									
No (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Yes	1.27***	1.31**	1.26**	1.27***	1.29**	1.27**	1.23***	1.18(*)	1.26**
Immigrant background									
Swedish (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Polish or Turkish	0.80**	0.82(*)	0.80*	0.86*	0.91	0.84(*)	0.94	0.97	0.94
N	2138.00	1105.00	1033.00	2138.00	1105.00	1033.00	2138.00	1105.00	1033.00

Table 4. Cox regression: Hazard ratio for first birth (by December 2012) by cohort and sex

	22 years in 1999			26 years in 1999			30 years in 1999		
	All	**Men**	**Women**	**All**	**Men**	**Women**	**All**	**Men**	**Women**
Gender attitudes, 1999									
Gender equal attitudes (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Traditional attitudes	1.11	1.06	1.14	1.38**	1.47**	1.25	1.14	1.19	1.19
Sex									
Men (ref.)	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
Women	1.26**	-	-	1.31**	-	-	1.64***	-	-
Education 1999									
Basic	0.83	0.82	0.85	0.74	1.35	0.45**	0.95	1.11	0.69
Upper secondary (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Lower post-secondary	1.01	1.06	0.96	1.10	1.25	0.98	1.61**	1.63*	1.66(*)
Upper post-secondary	no cases	no cases	no cases	1.06	1.04	1.05	1.72**	2.14**	1.46
Metropolitan residence 1999									
No (ref).	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yes	0.92	1.00	0.86	1.03	1.09	0.96	1.22	1.26	1.19
Partnership status 1999									
Unpartnered	0.50***	0.46***	0.54***	0.38***	0.41***	0.35***	0.47***	0.53**	0.38***
Partnered (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Unknown	0.86	0.91	0.74	0.18**	0.16*	0.32	3.31	4.07	no cases
Employed 1999									
No (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yes	1.20*	1.26*	1.15	1.36**	1.56**	1.26(*)	1.87*	1.05	3.89**
Immigrant background									
Swedish (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Polish or Turkish	0.75**	0.79(*)	0.72**	0.89	0.90	0.89	no cases	no cases	no cases
N	1032.00	495.00	537.00	727.00	377.00	350.00	379.00	233.00	146.00

Table 5. Cox regression: Hazard ratio for first birth (by December 2009) total and by sex

	First child by December 2009		
	All	**Men**	**Women**
Gender attitudes in 1999			
Gender equal attitudes (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00
Traditional attitudes	1.15(*)	1.40**	0.90
Sex			
Men (ref.)	1.00	-	-
Women	1.24***	-	-
Education 1999			
Basic	0.81	1.03	0.61*
Upper secondary (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00
Lower post-secondary	1.13	1.30*	0.98
Upper post-secondary	1.52***	1.88**	1.21
Age 1999			
22 (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00
26	1.15(*)	0.96	1.34**
30	0.77**	0.60***	1.00
Metropolitan residence in 1999			
No (ref).	1.00	1.00	1.00
Yes	1.04	1.16	0.93
Partnership status (time-varying)			
Single	0.07***	0.04***	0.10***
Cohabiting (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00
Married	2.07***	1.91***	2.33***
Employed in 1999			
No (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00
Yes	1.26**	1.27*	1.27**
Immigrant background			
Swedish (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00
Polish or Turkish	0.82*	0.87	0.79*
N	3423.00	1680.00	1743.00